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Introduction
Recent decades have been characterized by an explosive growth in the deployment of small,
mobile devices, ranging from personal digital assistant to smart phones and wireless sensors.
At the same time, more and more wireless communication technologies have been delivered,
such as the IEEE 802.11, Bluetooth, and cellular networks. This scenario has led to the
denition of the mobile computing paradigm, enabled by the so-called Mobile Distributed
Systems (MDSs).
As these systems become increasingly complex, their reliability begins to decrease due
to complex interactions between software modules and multiple applications. The sophis-
ticated software that is taking on more duties, can contain bugs, can be dicult to com-
prehend and analyze, and ages in quality over time. As a consequence, consumer tolerance
for application crashes and malfunctions is decreasing, and many consumers may consider
switching brands if their current device does not perform to expectations. Hence, the de-
pendability of these devices is directly related with the business opportunity. At the same
time, more and more critical-data-driven applications have been introduced on the mobile
computing market. Phone-based banking, ticket booking, and e-trading are examples of
applications where the user expects correct behavior despite accidental errors and/or ma-
licious tampering with the device. Dependability will become even more critical as new
applications emerge for mobile distributed systems, e.g., robot control [91, 62, 57], trac
control [4], telemedicine [7, 9], and video-surveillance [73]. In such scenarios, a failure af-
fecting the application could result in a signicant loss or hazard, e.g., a robot performing
1
2uncontrolled actions.
A signicant research quest is to evaluate the dependability levels that can be achieved by
these system in order to i) assess whether today's mobile distributed systems are adequate
enough to satisfy the requirements of highly dependable wireless-based systems, and ii)
evaluate how these systems meet dependability needs for the consumer-electronic mass-
market, such as, achieving reasonably low failure rates at a reasonable cost [93].
Despite these concerns, very few studies have looked into the dependability of mobile
distributed systems. As a result, there is little understanding of how and why these systems
fail or the methods/techniques needed to meet consumer expectations of device robustness
and reliability. The need to comprehend how these system fail cannot be understated. To-
day, no real numbers are available, neither published nor communicated by manufacturers,
able to give an order of magnitude estimate of failure rate experienced by mobile distributed
systems' users. It becomes thus hard to propose novel solutions for fault tolerance or new
models for fault forecasting if one has no notion of the actual failure behavior of these
systems.
Learning about the real failure behavior of these systems would be a major step forward.
A well established methodology to evaluate the dependability of operational systems and to
identify their dependability bottlenecks is represented by eld failure data analysis (FFDA).
The eort profused in this dissertation deals with the eld failure data analysis of mobile
distributed systems. To simplify the work, such analysis addresses separately the two main
components that build a MDS, i.e., mobile devices and wireless communication means,
trying to face the new issues which arise when applying the FFDA methodology to this
new class of systems. These issues are mainly related to the specicity of mobile devices,
to the absence of publicly available data sources, and to the lack of previous experiences.
In particular, for wireless communication means, it is needed to deal with the following
challenging questions:
3 Which data source can be adopted? Or, in other terms, which resources need to be
monitored to gain the needed understanding on wireless technologies failures?
 Can we use idle workloads? Wireless communications are used in a spot way. Hence,
the mere adoption of idle workloads (i.e., the normal load under which the system
operates) may not guarantee that continuous time dependability measures can be
properly estimated.
The situation gets even worse in the case of mobile devices. In particular, the following
open issues arise:
 Where do we have to start from? There is no prior experience on the FFDA of mobile
devices. In particular, the failure modes are still unknown. This knowledge is a
prerequisite to understand what type of information is to be gathered.
 How to collect the failure data? Dierently from traditional systems, no standard
techniques have been dened so far to perform an on-line logging of the activity of
mobile devices.
This dissertation tries to give answers to the above mentioned questions, by proposing
two FFDA campaigns on MDSs, one addressing a wireless communication technology, and
another related to mobile devices. Specically, the former proposes a detailed FFDA on
Bluetooth Personal Area Networks (PANs), whereas the second addresses smart phone
devices equipped with the Symbian OS. Both Bluetooth and the Symbian had been chosen
for their widespread use in today's MDSs, hence they are representative of a wide class
of today's MDSs. The proposed ndings are the result of a three years experience, and
partially extend previously published results, as [27][29][3].
As far as the Bluetooth campaign is concerned, multiple failure data sources and au-
tomated workloads are adopted. The use of multiple data sources enables to monitor the
4behavior of the thorough set of components which build the Bluetooth protocol stack. On
the other hand, the adoption of automated workload is needed to measure continuous time
dependability attributes and to gather a richer set of information in a relatively short period
of time. The experiments provide useful insights which are then used to characterize failures
distribution and to improve the dependability level of Bluetooth PANs. More specically,
the novel contribution of the work is threefold. First, a detailed failure model of Bluetooth
PANs is dened. Second, the self-robustness of Bluetooth wireless channels with respect
to faults aecting the radio channels is characterized. Third, failure masking and recovery
actions are proposes, able to improve the dependability level of Bluetooth PANs by orders
of magnitude.
As for the smart phone campaign, the starting point of the study has been an analysis of
failure reports submitted by mobile phones' users on publicly available web forums. Based
on this experience, a failure logger has been developed and deployed on actual smart phones,
which is able to capture all the failure information of interest. Results from the experimen-
tal campaign are totally new to the FFDA research community and allow to quantify the
dependability of today's commercial smart phones, and to put the evidence on the more
common causes lying behind the failures.
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows.
Chapter 1 provides the needed background on mobile distributed systems and on the de-
pendability of computer systems, then it reviews the state of art of mobile distributed
systems' dependability.
A description of the eld failure data analysis methodology is given in chapter 2. The
chapter also proposes a framework to analyze and confront the related work in the area,
5and concludes with a detailed comparison of the most signicant FFDA campaigns which
have been conducted over the last three decades.
Chapter 3 is dedicated to the FFDA study of Bluetooth PANs. After giving the necessary
background on the Bluetooth technology, the chapter outlines the data collection method-
ology which has been adopted, included the description of the workloads that have been
used to exercise the network. The details on the key ndings, along with the evaluation of
the obtained dependability improvement is given at the end of the chapter.
The Symbian smart phones FFDA is discussed in chapter 4. Similarly to chapter 4, it
rst provides the needed background on the Symbian OS, then it discussed the preliminary
results gained from the analysis of freely available failure reports posted by mobile phones
users. Moved from these results, the chapter describes the used data collection methodology,
discusses the design of the failure logger, and details the results of the analysis performed
by means of the logger.
The dissertation concludes with nal remarks and the indication of the lessons learned.
It is also evidenced the need for a unied methodology of FFDA studies, able to overcome
the diversity problems arising from the conduction of several dierent studies from dier-
ent actors. Such a methodology could facilitate the communication between the FFDA
research community, enabling a simpler comparison between future studies and enriching
their credibility.
Since we cannot know all that there is
to be known about anything, we ought
to know a little about everything.
Blaise Pascal
Chapter 1
Dependability of Mobile
Distributed Systems
Today's advantages in mobile computing hardware, as well as wireless networking, deliver more and
more complex mobile computing platforms, which today encompass a variety of systems, each one
characterized by specic kinds of mobile terminals and communication protocols. The wide spread
use of these mobile computing platforms is leading to a growing interest of dependability issues.
This chapter introduces separately the notions of mobile distributed systems and computer systems
dependability. Then it reviews the recent experience on Mobile Distributed Systems dependability,
motivating the need for more experimental research.
1.1 Mobile Distributed Systems, and Mobile Computing
The recent evolution in device miniaturization and wireless communication technologies
makes it possible to integrate small and portable computing devices into distributed systems,
leading to the notion of Mobile Distributed Systems (MDSs). Mobile devices include laptop
computers, handheld devices such as personal digital assistants (PDAs) and mobile phones,
wearable devices, and wireless sensors. The word \mobile" derives from the ability of
these devices to connect conveniently to networks in dierent places, making the mobile
computing paradigm possible. Mobile computing, is the performance of computing tasks
while the user is on the move, or visiting places other than their usual environment [33].
6
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In mobile computing, users who are away from their home intranet are still provided with
access to resources via the devices they carry with them. For this reason, is crucial for these
devices to be connected trough some form of wireless media. To this purpose, several wireless
technologies have been proposed recently. Examples are Bluetooth [12], IEEE 802.11 (Wi-
Fi [49]) and IrDA (Infrared Data Association [77]) for short ranges communication, and
2.5G, 3G cellular for wider coverages.
A MDS can thus be dened as a computer system which enables the mobile computing
paradigm and that is composed by two essential elements:
 a set of mobile devices;
 one or more wireless communication means.
Several instances of MDSs exist, that can be dierentiated with respect to the wire-
less means they adopt. Generally speaking, we can distinguish infrastructure-based MDSs,
where the connectivity is assured by means of special-purpose devices, called access points
(APs), and infrastructure-less MDSs, where the communication takes place via only multi-
hop wireless links between mobile devices. Infrastructure-based MDSs adhere to the no-
madic computing paradigm [59], i.e., a special typology of mobile computing where mobile
devices are nomads in wireless domains served by means of APs. Examples are IEEE 802.11
networks, Bluetooth Personal Area Networks [11], and cellular networks. On the other
hand, examples of infrastructure-less MDSs are mobile-ad-hoc networks (MANETs) [92],
and wireless sensor networks (WSNs) [2].
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Figure 1.1: Distributed systems evolution with respect to time, mobility, and integration
with the physical world (embeddedness)
Mobile computing is slightly evolving towards the ubiquitous computing vision. Ubiq-
uitous computing [111] is the harnessing of many small, cheap computational devices that
are present in users' physical environments, including the home, oce, and elsewhere. They
will be embedded in walls, chairs, clothing, light switches, cars - in everything. The term
\ubiquitous" is intended to suggest that such small devices will be so pervasive in everyday
objects that they will eventually become transparent to the user, and completely integrated
in the environment. The presence of computers everywhere only becomes useful when they
can communicate with one other. Hence, even in this case, it is essential to provide these
devices with wireless communication potentialities.
Figure 1.1 envision a graphic representation of the present and possible future evolu-
tion of distributed systems, from traditional xed systems and mobile systems to future
ubiquitous systems.
The race towards such innovation, pushes more and more mobile and embedded devices
on the market, with novel hardware platforms, communication technologies, and operating
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systems. Under tremendous market pressure and continuously shrinking time to market,
manufactures often cannot aord long comprehensive testing of the devices. As a result,
new (or enhanced) devices are often tested by the consumers, who start to be more con-
cerned about dependability issues. This may represent an issue for the fulllment of the
so-called \everyday dependability" requirements (meeting consumers needs with reasonable
low failure rates at a reasonable cost [93]). More importantly, failure events may become un-
acceptable as the use of MDSs is more often hypothesized into business- and mission-critical
scenarios.
Despite these concerns, very few studies have looked into the dependability of mobile
distributed systems. As a consequence, there is little understanding of how and why mo-
bile devices and/or wireless communication infrastructures fail or the methods/techniques
needed to meet consumer expectations of robustness and reliability.
1.2 Basic Notions of Dependability
The eort on the denition of the basic concepts and terminology for computer systems
dependability dates back to 1980, when a joint committee on \Fundamental Concepts and
Terminology" was formed by the Technical Committee on Fault-Tolerant Computing of the
IEEE Computer Society and the IFIP Working Group 10.4 \Dependable Computing and
Fault Tolerance". A synthesis of this work was presented at FTCS-15 in 1985 [65], where
computer system dependability was dened as the quality of the delivered service such that
reliance can justiably be placed on this service. This notion has evolved over the years.
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Recent eorts from the same community dene the dependability as the ability to avoid
service failures that are more frequent and more severe than is acceptable [1]. This last
denition has been introduced since it does not stress the need for justication of reliance.
The dependability is a composed quality attribute, that encompasses the following sub-
attributes:
 Availability: readiness for correct service;
 Reliability: continuity of correct service;
 Safety: absence of catastrophic consequences on the user(s) and the environment;
 Condentiality: absence of improper system alterations;
 Maintainability: ability to undergo modications and repairs.
Recently, the notion of everyday dependability [93] has emerged as a new challenge for the
computer system dependability community. While this community has traditionally faced
important research problems related to business- and mission-critical systems, which risk
catastrophic failures, the widespread use of consumer electronics and resource-constrained
mobile devices poses new dependability requirements even for commercial applications.
Everyday systems must be suciently dependable for the needs of everyday people.
They must thus provide cost-eective service with reasonable amounts of human attention.
Dependability for these everyday needs arises from matching dependability levels to actual
needs, achieving reasonably low failure rates at reasonable cost, providing understandable
mechanisms to recognize and deal with failure, and enabling creation of individually-tailored
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systems and congurations from available resources.
1.2.1 Threats
The causes that lead a system to deliver an incorrect service, i.e., a service deviating from
its function, are manifold and can manifest at any phase of its life-cycle. Hardware faults
and design errors are just an example of the possible sources of failure.
These causes, along with the manifestation of incorrect service, are recognized in the
literature as dependability threats, and are commonly categorized as failures, errors, and
faults [1].
A failure is an event that occurs when the delivered service deviates from correct service.
A service fails either because it does not comply with the functional specication, or because
this specication did not adequately describe the system function. A service failure is a
transition from correct service to incorrect service, i.e., to not implementing the system
function. The period of delivery of incorrect service is a service outage. The transition
from incorrect service to correct service is a service recovery or repair. The deviation from
correct service may assume dierent forms that are called service failure modes and are
ranked according to failure severities.
An error can be regarded as the part of a system's total state that may lead to a failure.
In other words, a failure occurs when the error causes the delivered service to deviate from
correct service. The adjudged or hypothesized cause of an error is called a fault. Faults
can be either internal or external of a system. Depending on their nature, faults can be
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Figure 1.2: The chain of threats of faults, errors, and failures (adapted from [1])
classied as:
 Development faults: include all the internal faults which originate during the devel-
opment phase of a system's hardware and software.
 Physical faults: include all the internal faults due to physical hardware damages or
misbehaviors.
 Interaction faults: include all the external faults deriving from the interaction of a
system with the external environment.
Failures, errors, and faults are related each other in the form of a chain of threats [1], as
sketched in gure 1.2. A fault is active when it produces an error; otherwise, it is dormant.
An active fault is either i) an internal fault that was previously dormant and that has been
activated, or ii) an external fault. A failure occurs when an error is propagated to the service
interface and causes the service delivered by the system to deviate from correct service. An
error which does not lead the system to failure is said to be a latent error. A failure of a
system component causes an internal fault of the system that contains such a component,
or causes an external fault for the other system(s) that receive service from the given system.
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1.2.2 Formalization and Measures
This section provides a more formal characterization of the dependability attributes of in-
terest for this dissertation, along with the basic measures which are commonly used to
quantify them.
Reliability
The reliability R(t) of a system is the conditional probability of delivering a correct service
in the interval [0; t], given that the service was correct at the reference time 0 [100]:
R(0 ; t) = P(no failures in [0 ; t ]jcorrect service in 0 ) (1.1)
Let us call F (t) the unreliability function, i.e., the cumulative distribution function of the
failure time. The reliability function can thus be written as:
R(t)=1-F(t) (1.2)
The reliability was the only dependability measure of interest to early designers of depend-
able computer systems. Since reliability is a function of the mission duration T , mean time
to failure (MTTF) is often used as a single numeric indicator of system reliability [82]. In
particular, the time to failure (TTF) of a system is dened as the interval of time between
a system recovery and the consecutive failure, as evidenced in gure 1.3.
Another widely adopted measure of reliability is the failure rate, that is, the frequency
with which a system fails. Failure rates can be expressed using any measure of time, but
hours is the most common unit in practice. The Failures In Time (FIT) rate of a device is
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the number of failures that can be expected in one billion (109) hours of operation. This
term is used particularly by the semiconductor industry. Usually, the failure rate of a sys-
tem is not constant during all the system life-time, but it follows the so-called bath-tube
form, i.e., a system experiences a decreasing failure rate when it is rstly deployed, due
to infant-mortality failures, then it follows a rather constant failure rate during the opera-
tional life, and, nally, it experiences an increasing failure rate at the end of its life, due to
wear-out failures.
Maintainability
The maintainability, M(t), is generally referred as the ability of a system to be easily
repaired after the occurrence of a failure. A commonly adopted indicator for the maintain-
ability is the mean time to recover (MTTR). In particular, the time to recover (TTR) can
be dened as the time needed to perform a repair, that is, the interval of time between a
failure and its consequent recovery, as shown in gure 1.3.
Availability
A system is said to be available at a the time t if it is able to provide a correct service at
that instant of time. The availability can thus be thought as the expected value E(A(t)) of
the following A(t) function:
A(t) =

1 if proper service at t
0 otherwise
(1.3)
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In other terms, the availability is the fraction of time that the system is operational. The
measuring of the availability became important with the advent of time-sharing systems.
These systems brought with it an issue for the continuity of computer service and thus
minimizing the \down time" became a prime concern. Availability is a function not only
of how rarely a system fails but also of how soon it can be repaired upon failure. Clearly,
a synthetic availability indicator can be computed as:
Av =
MTTF
MTTF + MTTR
=
MTTF
MTBF
(1.4)
where MTBF = MTTF + MTTR is the mean time between failures. As evidenced in gure
1.3, the time between failures (TBF) is the time interval between two consecutive failures.
Obviously, this measure makes sense only for the so-called repairable systems.
When measuring MTTF and MTTR, it is important to characterize their variability, in
terms of the standard deviation or in terms of the coecient of variation. The coecient
of variation Cv is dened as the standard deviation divided by the mean. The advantage
of using the Cv as a measure of variability, rather than the standard deviation, is that
it is normalized by the expected value, and hence allows comparison of variability across
distributions with dierent expected values.
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1.2.3 Means
Over the course of the past 50 years many means have been developed to attain the various
attributes of dependability. These means can be grouped into four major categories [1]:
 Fault prevention, to prevent the occurrence or introduction of faults. Fault pre-
vention is enforced during the design phase of a system, both for software (e.g., in-
formation hiding, modularization, use of strongly-typed programming languages) and
hardware (e.g., design rules).
 Fault tolerance, to avoid service failures in the presence of faults. It takes place
during the operational life of the system. A widely used method of achieving fault
tolerance is redundancy, either temporal or spatial. Temporal redundancy attempts
to reestablish proper operation by bringing the system in a error-free state and by
repeating the operation which caused the failure, while spatial redundancy exploits
the computation performed by multiple system's replicas. The former is adequate for
transient faults, whereas the latter can be eective only under the assumption that
the replicas are not aected by the same permanent faults. This can be achieved
through design diversity [5].
Both temporal and spatial redundancy requires error detection and recovery tech-
niques to be in place: upon error detection (i.e., the ability to identify that an error
occurred in the system), a recovery action is performed. Such a recovery can assume
the form of rollback (the system is brought back to a saved state that existed prior the
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occurrence of the error; it needs to periodically save the system state, via checkpoint-
ing techniques [109]), rollforward (the system is brought to a new, error-free state),
and compensation (a deep knowledge of the erroneous state is available to enable error
to be masked). Fault masking, or simply masking, results from the systematic usage
of compensation. Such masking will prevent completely failures from occurring.
The measure of eectiveness of any given fault tolerance technique is called its cover-
age, i.e, the percentage of the total number of failures that are successfully recovered
by the fault tolerance mean.
 Fault removal, to reduce the number and severity of faults. The removal activity
is usually performed during the verication and validation phases of the system de-
velopment, by means of testing and/or fault injection [6]. However, fault removal
can also be done during the operational phase, in terms of corrective and perfective
maintenance.
 Fault forecasting, to estimate the present number, the future incidence, and the
likely consequences of faults. Fault forecasting is conducted by performing an evalua-
tion of the system behavior with respect to fault occurrence or activation. Evaluation
has two aspects: qualitative, or ordinal, evaluation, that aims at identifying, classify-
ing, and ranking the failure modes that would lead to system failures; and quantitative,
or probabilistic, evaluation, that aims to evaluate in terms of probabilities the extent
to which some of the attributes are satised; those attributes are then viewed as mea-
sures.
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The quantitative evaluation can be performed at dierent phases of the system's life
cycle: the design phase, the prototype phase and the operational phase [50]. In the de-
sign phase, the dependability can be evaluated via modeling and simulation, including
simulated fault injection. The simulation can give immediate feedback to the design-
ers who can timely improve the design. Simulation parameters are however based on
past experiences on same systems, and these parameters can be often invalidated by
changes in the technology. During the prototype phase, a prototype version of the
system runs under controlled conditions. This activity can only study the eects of
induced faults. Important measures, such as the mean time to failure, cannot be de-
rived. It is carried out via controlled fault injection experiments, in order to evaluate
the system resilience to software and/or hardware faults, including the coverage and
recovery capabilities of the system. Finally, during the operational phase, eld failure
data analysis (FFDA) can be performed, aiming at measuring the dependability at-
tributes of a system according to the failures that naturally manifest during system
operation. As FFDA is the central topic of this dissertation, it is widely described in
chapter 2.
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1.3 Experiences on Mobile Distributed Systems' Depend-
ability
Recent research eorts on MDSs have mainly addressed architectural and technological
issues, such as the denition of ad-hoc routing protocols, mobility management middle-
ware/architectures, and wireless communication protocols. However, as MDSs increase in
popularity, more attention is being devoted to dependability issues. In the early 90s, typ-
ical failure modes for a wireless system were already clear [61], while at the beginning of
this century has been recognized that \as wireless and mobile services grow, weaknesses in
network infrastructures become clearer. Providers must now consider ways to decrease the
number of network failures and to cope with failures when they do occur" [97].
In the following, exemplary experiences which have been recently matured on MDS's
dependability are reported.
1.3.1 Failure modes
The typical failure modes of a MDS are known since many years. In [61], Vaidya et al.
proposed the following three failure modes:
 node failures, i.e., a node of the MDS stops running;
 connectivity failures, that is, a node looses its connectivity to the wireless network or
it is not able to connect to the network;
 packet losses, due to weak wireless links.
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Since the focus in [61] was on cellular networks, connectivity failures were referred to
as the unavailability of the connection to the access point. With the advent of MANETs
and WSNs, connectivity failures broaden their scope, leading to isolation or partitioning
failures, i.e., one or more nodes loosing their connectivity to the rest of the network due
to failures of the nodes in the proximity. Examples of works dealing with isolation failures
are [10], [81], and [17].
1.3.2 Fault tolerance techniques
MDSs' fault tolerance techniques can be regarded with respect to the failure class they
address. Here, experiences on the tolerance of connectivity failures, access point failures,
and node failures are reported.
As for connectivity failures, the contribution in [22] proposes an apporach of tolerating
connectivity problems due to the existence of \shadow regions", in IEEE 802.11g wireless
networks. Simply, a redundant access point (AP) is placed in the shadow region to serve the
mobile stations which roam into that region. With numerical examples, authors show that
the redundancy schemes demonstrate signicant improvement in connection dependability
over the scheme with no redundancy. Zandy et al. [114] present two systems, reliable
sockets (rocks) and reliable packets (racks), that provide transparent network connection
mobility using only user-level mechanisms. Each system can detect a connectivity failure
within seconds of its occurrence, preserve the endpoint of a failed connection in a suspended
state for an arbitrary period of time, and automatically reconnect, with correct recovery of
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in-ight data.
A mean to address partitioning problems in MANETs is described in [81]. In particular,
the approach tries to recover the disconnected portion of the MANET by deploying for-
warding nodes. The forwarding nodes can automatically move to appropriate locations for
interconnecting network partitions. The mechanism is distributed and self-organized and
can be integrated with other routing protocols. Connectivity failures for nomadic wireless
networks are also addressed by triggering hando procedures as soon as a broken link event
is recognized [8, 105].
Access point failures can be considered as more severe than connectivity failures, be-
cause, when an access point fails, all of the mobile stations connected to a wired network
via the access point loose connectivity. A new fault-detection approach for access point
failures is presented in [43], with reference to IEEE 802.11 wireless networks. The approach
is based on the signal-to-noise ratio, and promises to be more eective than traditional
heartbeats. Moreover, authors describe and compare three techniques to recover from
access-point failures in 802.11 wireless networks, namely access point redundancy (simi-
larly as [22]), overlapped coverage, and multiplexed links (multiple wireless links for each
mobile device).
The tolerance of node failures have been in part addressed by means of checkpointing
techniques. The scheme proposed in [83] adopts optimistic logging for checkpointing, since
it exhibit lower failure-free operation and failure recovery costs compared to other logging
schemes. In the proposed scheme, the task of logging is assigned to the APs to reduce the
message overhead. A similar approach is suggested in [113], which is also able to tolerate
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access point failures.
The problem of node failures becomes particularly signicant in the context of infrastructure-
less MDSs, since node failures may lead to partitioning failures. In particular, there is a
need for fault tolerance in WSNs, due to the harsh environmental conditions in which such
networks can be deployed. The work in [30] focuses on nding algorithms for collaborative
target detection with wireless sensor networks that are ecient in terms of communication
cost, precision, accuracy, and number of faulty sensors tolerable in the network. Strategies
for node failures tolerance have also been proposed in [61], with particular emphasis on data
management.
1.3.3 Dependability improvement
As a response to the solicitation given in [97] about the need to decrease the number
of failures, there have been several attempts for improving the dependability of dierent
aspects of MDSs.
Intelligent, goal-directed mobility algorithms for achieving desired topological charac-
teristics is introduced in [17], with reference to MANETs. These algorithms can improve
the connectivity, coverage, and diameter of a MANET, even when faults aect the nodes
of the network. In [38] authors propose an adaptive hybrid ARQ/FEC scheme to enhance
the data throughput over Bluetooth networks based on observed error rates. The scheme
is demonstrated to outperform the standard Bluetooth schemes, in the presence of errors.
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[60] is concerned with the choice of Cyclic redundancy codes (CRCs) suitable for resource-
constrained embedded systems, equipped with 8-bit micro-controllers. Authors evaluate the
options for speeding up CRC computations on such processors, and evaluate classes of CRC
generator polynomials which have the same computational cost as 24- or 16-bit CRCs, but
provide 32-bit CRC levels of error detection. Finally, they recommend good polynomials
within those classes for data word lengths typical of embedded networking applications.
A mobility management solution that improves the connection availability is presented
in [28]. In particular, a Last Second Soft Hando scheme is proposed, able to minimize
connection unavailabilities in spite of transient signal degradations and access point over-
loads. The scheme has been integrated into a mobility management architecture, which
provides connection awareness by means of an API, named Nomadic Computing Sockets
(NCSOCKS), which handles temporary disconnections similarly to the reliable sockets ap-
proach [114].
1.3.4 Dependability Modeling
The modeling approach has been adopted to address several dependability aspects of MDSs.
The work in [10] investigates the connectivity of MANETs in a log-normal shadow fad-
ing environment. Assuming a spatial Poisson distribution of the network nodes, authors
derive a closed-form expression for the probability that a node is isolated. The same issue
is addressed in [89], where authors also consider the mobile version of the problem, in which
nodes are allowed to move during a time interval. In [86] the Stochastic Activity Network
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modeling approach is adopted for evaluating the dependability of a General Packet Radio
Service (GPRS) network under outage conditions. Stochastic Activity Networks have also
been adopted in [14], where authors introduce a general framework that encompasses perfor-
mance, dependability and mobility of software systems and that supports the specication
and estimate of dependability measures.
1.3.5 Dependability Evaluation
Fault forecasting of MDSs is generally undertaken by means of modeling and simulation
activities. Examples are all the works considered in the previous subsection. As a further
example, Trivedi et al. [23] propose models to evaluate the survivability of a wireless network.
Network survivability reects the ability of a network to continue to function during and
after failures. Authors perceive the network survivability as a composite measure consisting
of both network failure duration and failure impact on the network. Assuming Markovian
property for the system, this measure is obtained by solving a set of Markov models.
Limited experience has been matured on the eld dependability evaluation of opera-
tional MDSs. This is in part due to the relative youth of these systems, but it is also a
consequence of the diculties which arise when applying the FFDA methodology to MDSs
(see section 2.6). Some preliminary eort in this direction is represented by works such
as [74] and [39]. The former proposes a FFDA for the base stations of a wireless telecom-
munication system, whereas the latter reports on a collection of user-perceived failure data
from Bluetooth piconets. Further eort is represented by the material presented in this
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dissertation, as described in chapters 3 and 4.
1.4 The Need for FFDA on Mobile Distributed Systems
The lack of experiences on the FFDA of MDSs motivates the need for more research provid-
ing deep understanding on MDSs' failure dynamics, measures, and underlying causes. Such
understanding is useful to drive the design, and it is one of the key issues in the discussions
of architecture and system structure of a product [25]. Hence, it cannot be understated.
Today, if we were to ask for an order of magnitude estimate of failure rate experienced by
MDSs users, we do not have any real numbers, neither published nor made available by
manufacturers.
At the same time there is an increasing need for everyday dependability in the com-
mercial arena. However, it is hard to realize a system or solution for fault tolerance, or to
propose new models for fault forecasting if one has no notion of the actual failure behavior
of these systems.
Learning about the real failure behavior of these system would be a major step forward.
This task can be accomplished by proposing FFDA studies on MDSs. To simplify the work,
such studies can address separately the two components that build a MDS, i.e., mobile
devices and wireless communication means. Indeed, the two components are inherently
dierent and may require dierent measurement strategies.
If you steal from one author it's
plagiarism; if you steal from many it's
research.
Wilson Mizner
Chapter 2
Field Failure Data Analysis:
Methodology and Related Work
Field Failure Data Analysis (FFDA in the following) provide information that allows the eect of
errors on system behavior to be understood. It provides accurate information on the system being
observed, for the elaboration and validation of analytical models, and for the improvement of the
development process. The collected data helps to explain and to characterize the system under study.
Qualitative analysis of the failure, error and fault types observed in the eld yields feedback to the
development process and can thus contribute to improving the production process [26]. As stated
in [50], \there is no better way to understand dependability characteristics of computer systems than
by direct measurements and analysis".
This chapter discusses the principles of the FFDA methodology and provide a useful framework
to evaluate and classify FFDA studies. Based on this framework, the related literature of the latest
three decades is examined and compared. Finally, a discussion about open issues and challenges
about the FFDA of MDSs concludes the chapter.
2.1 FFDA Objectives and Applicability
The Field Failure Data Analysis of a computer system embraces all fault forecasting tech-
niques which are performed in the operational phase of the system's life time. This analysis
aim at measuring dependability attributes of the actual and deployed system, under real
workload conditions. By measuring it is meant to monitor and record natural occurring
errors and failures while the normal system operation. In other words, the failing behavior
is not forced or induced in the systems. The objective of a FFDA campaign mainly concerns
26
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the detailed characterization of the actual dependability behavior of the operational system.
More in detail, FFDA studies main objectives can be summarized as the following:
 identication of the classes of errors/failures as they manifest in the eld, along with
their relative severity and correlation among them. In other terms, FFDA is useful
to derive the actual failure model of an operational system;
 analysis of failure and recovery times statistical distributions;
 correlation between failures and system workload;
 modeling of the failing behavior and recovery mechanisms, if any;
 identication of the root causes of outages, and indication of dependability bottle-
necks;
 provision of gures useful to validate or to populate simulated failure models;
 derivation of general results which a crucial to guide research and development.
Although FFDA studies are useful for evaluating the real system, they are limited to
manifested failures, such as the ones that can be traced. In addition, the particular con-
ditions under which the system is observed can vary from an installation to another, thus
casting doubts on the statistical validity of the results. It is worth noting that the analysis
of data collected on a given system is hardly benecial to the current version of the system.
It can be instead useful for the successive generations of systems. Finally, FFDA studies
may require a long period of observation of the target system, especially when the system
is robust and failure events are rare.
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Figure 2.1: The FFDA methodology
To achieve statistical validity and to shorten the observation period, these studies should
be carried out on more than one deployed system, each of them under dierent environ-
mental conditions.
2.2 The FFDA Methodology
FFDA studies usually account three consecutive steps, as shown in gure 2.1: i) data log-
ging and collection, where data are gathered from the actual system, ii) data ltering and
manipulation, concerning the extraction of the information which are useful for the analysis,
and iii) data analysis, that is the derivation of the intended results from the manipulated
data. In this section, details about the best practice on each of these steps are presented.
2.2.1 Data Logging and Collection
Data logging and collection consists in the denition of what to collect and how to collect
it. This require a preliminary study of the system, and its environment, in order to identify
the technique that can be successfully used, or to decide whether it is necessary to develop
an ad-hoc monitoring system. The choice of the appropriate technique also depends on the
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purposes of the analysis.
Common techniques for data logging and collection are failure reports and event logging.
Failure reports are generated by human operators, typically users or specialized maintenance
sta. A report usually contains information such as the date and hour when the failure has
occurred, a description of the observed failing behavior, the action taken by the operator
to restore proper operation, the hardware/software module pinpointed as responsible of the
failure, and, if possible, the root cause of the failure. The problem with this technique is
that human operators are responsible for the detection of the failure, hence some failure may
remain undetected. Moreover, the information contained in the report can vary from one
operator to another, depending on his experiences and opinions. Recently, automated failure
report systems have been proposed. An example is represented by the Microsoft's Corporate
Error Reporting software. It creates a detailed report every time that an application crashes
or hangs, or when the OS crashes. The report contains a snapshot of the computer's state
during the crash. This information includes a list containing the name and time-stamp of
binaries that were loaded in the computer's memory at the time of crash, as well as a brief
stack trace. This information allows for a quick identication of the routine that caused
the failure as well as the reason and cause for the failure.
Event logs are machine-generated. Data are logged by user and system applications
and modules running on the machine, and contains information either about the regular
execution or about erroneous behaviors. Hence, from these logs, it is possible to extract
useful information about failures which occur on the system. An event log entry typically
contains a time-stamp of the event and a description, along with the application/system
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module that signaled the event. A limit of event logging is that the detection of a fail-
ure event depends on whether or not the application/system module logs that particular
event. In other terms, not all the possible erroneous conditions are logged. Thus, with this
technique it might be hard to pinpoint root causes of each failure event.
An example of an event logging system is the syslogd daemon for Unix operating sys-
tems. This background process records events generated by dierent local sources: kernel,
system components (disk, network interfaces, memory), daemons and application processes
that are congured to communicate with syslogd. Dierent event types with dierent
severity levels are generally recorded. Severity levels are: 1) emergency, 2) alert, 3) critical,
4) error, 5) warning, 6) notice, 7) info, and 8) debug. Events are composed by a time-
stamp, the host, the user, the process name and id, and the event description itself. The
conguration le /etc/syslog.conf species the destination le of each event received by
syslogd, depending on its severity level and its origin. A le of severity level X will contain
entries which severity ranges from level 1 to level X. Hence, a debug log le holds all kinds
of information, whereas an emergency log le only keeps panic information.
The same principles apply to the MS Windows operating systems. For NT and 2K,
the event logger is implemented as a system service that runs in the background and waits
for processes running on the local (or a remote) system to send it reports of events. Each
event report is stored in a specic event log le. Three event log les are dened: the
security log, for security information and auditing, the system log, for events logged by
system modules, and the application log, for application related information. Events are
composed by an event type (information, error, warning), a time-stamp, the source of the
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event, the category, the event ID, the user, and the computer.
In some cases failure reports and event logs cannot be used, and ad-hoc monitoring
systems need to be developed. First, these techniques are not available for any class of
system. Examples are the Java virtual machine [32], and the Symbian OS (see chapter 4)
where the native monitoring systems are neither present nor sucient to conduct proper
analysis. Second, these techniques may result inadequate for a certain class of studies. For
instance, the work in [35] aims at characterizing the security behavior of a system under
attack. Thus, the monitoring system had to take into account and collect the network trac
aecting the machines under attack.
Usually, FFDA studies adopt idle workloads, i.e., the normal load under which the
system operates. However, there are cases where the system is solicited under automated
workloads, i.e, applications running on the system to emulate the potential use of the sys-
tem. Automated workloads are required in those cases where the system load is sporadic or
highly intermittent and thus the analysis under the idle workload is not feasible. They may
also be useful for interactive systems, which require human operators to use the system.
The workload can in this case emulate the behavior of a human operator.
2.2.2 Data Filtering and Manipulation
Data ltering and manipulation consist in analyzing the collected data for correctness,
consistency, and completeness. This concerns the ltering of invalid data and the coalescence
of redundant or equivalent data. This is especially true when event logs are used. Logs,
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Figure 2.2: Multiple event reporting phenomenon (adapted from [46])
indeed, contain many information which are not related to failure events. In addition, events
which are close in time may be representative of one single failure events. They thus need
to be coalesced into one failure event.
Filtering is used to reduce the amount of information to be stored, and to concentrate
the attention only on a signicant set of data, thus simplifying the analysis process. Two
basic ltering strategies can be adopted: blacklist and whitelist strategies. The blacklist
can be thought as a list of all the terms that surely identify an event which is not of interest
for the analysis. The blacklist ltering discards all those events which description message
contains at least one of the blacklist terms. On the contrary, the whitelist is the list of all
permitted terms, hence only events which contain these terms are not rejected.
Coalescence techniques can be distinguished into temporal, spatial, and content-based.
Temporal coalescence, or tupling [46], exploits the heuristic of the tuple, i.e., a collection of
events which are close in time. The heuristic is based on the observation that often more
than one failure events are reported together, due to the same underlying fault. Indeed, as
the eects of the fault propagate through a system, hardware and software detectors are
triggered resulting in multiple events. Moreover, the same fault may persist or repeat often
over time. Figure 2.2 shows the multiple reporting of events. When a fault occurs, many
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errors can be generated. Some of these errors are detected by error detectors, which in turn
may or not report an event into the log le.
To explain how the tupling scheme works, let us represent with Xi the i-th entry in the
log, and with t(Xi) the timestamp of the entry Xi. The tupling algorithm, respects the
following rule:
IF t(Xi+1)  t(Xi) < W THEN
Add Xi+1 to the tuple
where W is a congurable time window. The window size is a crucial parameter which
need to be carefully tuned in order to minimize collapses (events related to two dierent
faults are grouped into the same tuple) and truncations (events related to the same fault
are grouped into more than one tuple).
Spatial coalescence is used to relate events which occur close in time but on dierent
nodes of the system under study. It allows to identify failure propagations among nodes,
resulting particularly useful when targeting distributed systems. The techniques adopted
for spatial coalescence are usually the same as the ones used for temporal coalescence.
Finally, content-based coalescence groups several events into one event by looking at
the specic content of the events into the event log. For example, in [95] this technique
is adopted to identify machine reboots: when a the system is restarted, a sequence of ini-
tialization events is generated by the system. By looking at the specic contents of these
events, it is possible to develop proper algorithms to identify machine reboots sequences
and group them into one \reboot" event. Also, content-based coalescence can be used to
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group events belonging to the same type [15].
2.2.3 Data Analysis
\Even when the data are available, the challenge is to be able to use it, which is no simple
task" [25].
This challenge is addressed in the data analysis step, which consists in performing sta-
tistical analysis on the manipulated data to identify trends and to evaluate quantitative
measures. Failure classication is a rst analysis step, which aims at categorizing all the
observed failures on the basis of their nature and/or location. In addition, descriptive statis-
tics can be derived from the data to analyze the location of faults, errors and failures among
system components, the severity of failures, the time to failure or time to repair distribu-
tions, the impact of the workload on the system behavior, the coverage of error detection
and recovery mechanisms, etc. Commonly used statistical measures in the analysis include
frequency, percentage, and probability distribution [40]. They are often used to quantify
the reliability, the availability, and the maintainability. Their summary characterization
can be obtained by the direct measurement of the MTTF and MTTR, as already observed
in section 1.2.2.
More detailed analysis try to determine the probability distribution of the \time to fail-
ure" variable, and, in some cases, of the \time to repair". This permits to detail the failure
model of the system under study. To this aim, the real data are tted with theoretical, con-
tinuous time distributions. The most adopted distributions in this eld are the exponential,
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the hyper-exponential, the lognormal, and the weibull. The exponential distribution was
rstly adopted to model the time to failure and time to repair of electronic components.
However, it has been often shown that this distribution does not t real data, especially
when the data involves multiple underlying causes or software failures. This is due to the
simplistic memoryless property of the exponential distribution. If a process consists of
alternate phases, that is, during any single experiment, the process experiences one and
only one of many alternate phases, and these phases have exponential distributions, then
the overall distribution is hyper-exponential [106]. This distribution can be used to model
failure times of failures which are the manifestation of dierent, independent and alternate
underlying causes.
Recently, the lognormal distribution has been recognized as a proper distribution for
software failure rates [78]. Many successful analytical models of software behavior share
assumptions that suggest that the distribution of software event rates will asymptotically
approach lognormal. The lognormal distribution has its origin in the complexity, that is the
depth of conditionals, of software systems and the fact that event rates are determined by
an essentially multiplicative process. The central limit theorem links these properties to the
lognormal: just as the normal distribution arises when summing many random terms, the
lognormal distribution arises when the value of a variable is determined by the multiplication
of many random factors.
The weibull distribution has been used to describe fatigue failures and electronic com-
ponents failures. At present, it is perhaps the most widely used parametric family of failure
distributions. The reason is that by a proper choice of its shape parameter, an increasing,
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a decreasing, or a constant failure rate distribution can be obtained. Therefore, it can be
used for all the phases of the bath-tube mortality curve [106].
In practice, the family of the distribution and its associated parameters have to be
estimated from the collected data. Usually, a family of distribution is chosen and the tting
is conducted via a parameter estimation, e.g., maximum likelihood estimation. Goodness-
of-t tests can be conducted to determine whether the data can reasonably be declared to
belong to the chosen family.
Other types of analysis are concerned with the correlation between failure distributions.
The correlation can uncover possible links between failures in dierent hardware and soft-
ware modules or in dierent nodes constituting the system under study. This analysis can
also conduct to the discovery of trends among failure data on event logs. From a theoretical
perspective, the trend analysis of event logs is based on the common observation that a
module exhibits a period of (potentially) increasing unreliability before nal failure. By
discovering these unreliability trends, it can be possible to predict the occurrence of certain
failures. To this aim, principal component analysis, cluster analysis, and tupling can be
adopted [94].
Finally, the analysis activity often conducts to the development of simulation models of
the dependability behavior. Models often adopted in the literature are state-machines, fault
trees, Markov chains, and Petri nets. The understanding gathered from eld data allows to
dene these models and to populate their parameters with realistic gures, e.g., failure and
recovery rates.
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2.2.4 Tools for FFDA
Although FFDA has evolved signicantly over the last decades, the data analysis work is
normally done manually with ad hoc techniques, using programming languages or statistical
packages. However, these statistical packages provide only standard procedures, not a
complete methodology in the context of dependability analysis for computer systems. It
has thus emerged the need to have software packages which integrate a wide range of the
state-of-the-art techniques in FFDA (e.g., data collecting, data coalescing, and modeling)
and which can generate appropriate dependability models and measures from eld data in
an automatic fashion. A rst example toward this direction was the MEASURE+ tool [103].
Given measured data from real systems in a specied format MEASURE+ can generate
appropriate dependability models and measures including Markov and semi-Markov models,
k-out-of-n availability models, failure distribution and hazard functions, and correlation
parameters.
A more recent and user-friendly tool for critical systems is represented by MEADEP
[101]. It consists of 4 software modules: a data preprocessor for converting data in various
formats to the MEADEP format, a data analyzer for graphical data-presentation and pa-
rameter estimation, a graphical modeling interface for building block diagrams (including
the exponential block, Weibull block, and k-out-of-n block) and Markov reward chains, and
a model-solution module for availability/reliability calculations with graphical parametric
analysis.
Analyze NOW [104] is a set of tools specically tailored for the FFDA of networks of
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workstations. It embodies tools for the automated data collection from all the workstations,
and tools for the analysis of such data. Basic analysis tools are: i) the Filter, that lters
out all non essential messages, ii) the Analyzer, which performs the tasks of extracting
all possible information about each failure, of correlating failures collected from dierent
workstations, and of classifying failures, and iii) tabulator and graph TBF, which are tools
for the presentation of the results, either in a tabular or graphical form.
2.3 Comparison Framework of FFDA Studies
Several FFDA studies have been proposed in the literature over the past three decades,
each of them addressing dierent systems, collecting data from dierent data sources, and
proposing dierent results. Hence, it is not simple to catch all similarities and dierences
among dierent studies, and to draw common conclusions. What the FFDA research has
achieved so far, what is still missing, and if in the future we will be able to conduct FFDA
studies even more eciently and eectively are key research questions that need to be
answered.
This section proposes several classifying dimensions of FFDA studies. These dimensions
represent a common framework useful to compare and to analyze these studies.
In the following subsections, the dimensions are described, then, the related work on
FFDA over the last three decades is examined according to them.
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2.3.1 Descriptive Dimensions
Six are the proposed descriptive dimensions.
Date: The date when the study was conducted. The time framework is important to
contextualize the study.
Purpose: The reasons and goals that are at the basis of the work. In the following, three
coarse grained purposes are indicated:
 FFDA Methodology : works providing contributions to the FFDA community
itself, that is, denition of new techniques and methodologies for FFDA (such
as, novel collection/ltering/coalescing techniques), evaluation and comparison
of dierent specic FFDA techniques/methodologies, explicit evidences of FFDA
eectiveness.
 Dependability Study : traditional works on the failure classication, on the eval-
uation of dependability measures, such as MTTF, availability, MTTR, coverage,
on the identication on statistical/simulation models, such as statistical distri-
butions, markov-chains, nite state machines, and on correlation analysis such
as trend analysis.
 Comparison: works which compare two or more FFDA studies trying to identify
common trends and conclusions.
Actor: Indicates whether the work is performed by academy, industry, or by a collaboration
of both the academia and the industry.
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Source: Indicates whether the analyzed failure data is provided by third party organiza-
tions or if it is internal (e.g., laboratory testbeds, university facilities, etc.).
Target System: The actual computer system under study.
Achieved results: The most interesting results obtained by the study. Examples are the
identication of statistical distributions, the percentage of failures classes (e.g., the
percentage of software failures), or particular uncoverings, such as the pinpointing of
dependability bottlenecks.
2.3.2 Quantitative Dimensions
Quantitative dimensions characterize the physical size of the study, in terms of the time
length and the amount of collected failure data items. In particular, the considered dimen-
sions are:
Length (l): the temporal length (measured in months) of the experiment, that is, for how
long the system under study has been observed.
Data items (Nd): the number of failure data items used for the study.
When considered together, the length and the data items provide the measure of the density
of events which are used for the study. In particular:
d =
Nd
l
(2.1)
where d is the density measured as [items/month]. The bigger the density, the more items
can be collected in a time unit. The density gives an indication of the length a study should
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be performed in order to be statistically signicant. For instance, if the density is low, it is
necessary to run the experiment for a long period, in order to gather a signicant amount
of data points. A useful practice would be to observe the density for a short period, and,
depending on its value, decide i) whether to increase/decrease the number of system's units
to include in the analysis (the more the units, the bigger Nd), and ii) how long the experi-
ment should take.
2.3.3 Methodology-related Dimensions
These dimensions are related to the steps of the FFDA methodology that has been discussed
in section 2.2. The following dimensions are dened:
Data source: the source from where eld failure data are gathered, e.g. event logs or
failure reports.
Levels: the levels at which the data source are considered. They correspond to the ab-
stract machine levels (from hardware to human operators) the gathered failure events
correspond to. Examples are: hardware, network, operating system, middleware,
application, and human operator.
Workload: whether the workload is idle or automated.
Manipulation: the set of techniques, if any, adopted to lter and/or process the gathered
data.
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Analysis: the particular statistical analysis performed on the ltered data. The performed
analysis can be grouped according to the following classes:
 Classication: derivation of the classes of failures/errors along with their causes,
if available. In other words, classication consists in the denition of the exper-
imental failure/error model;
 Dependability measurements: MTTF, MTTR, FIT, availability, coverage, up-
time, downtime;
 Modeling : denition of a statistical/simulation model from the real data. Exam-
ples are statistical distributions (weibull, lognormal, hyperexponential), markov
chains, and nite state machines.
 Correlation: identication of either temporal trends among subsequent failures,
or spatial correlation among dierent system's nodes. Examples of the adopted
analysis techniques are trend analysis, cluster analysis, factor analysis.
 Other : particular analysis which do not fall in any of the above mentioned classes,
such as the sensitivity analysis of tupling schemes.
Often, FFDA studies fall into more than one analysis class. For example, it is common
that works proposing dependability measurements also perform a classication.
Condence: It is indicated whether the study provides any measure for the condence or
variability of the data (e.g., standard deviation, coecient of variation, etc.).
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The dened dimensions allow to have a quick survey on the methods and techniques
adopted by a particular study to gather and process data, along with the type of conducted
analysis.
2.4 Analysis of Related Research
The importance of FFDA studies of computer systems has been recognized since many
years. The rst seminal contributions date back to the 70s with studies on the Chi/OS
for the Univac [72], and CRAY-1 systems [58]. The research has then broadened its scope
over the years addressing a wide set of systems and pursuing several objectives. The 80s
and the 90s have been characterized by FFDA studies on mainframe and multicomputer
systems, such as the IBM 370 with the MVS OS [108] [53] [98] [99] [48] [51] [52], the DEC
VAX [16] [15] [102] [110], and Tandem systems [45] [46] [66]. In the second half of 90s the
research slightly moved its attention to end-user and interactive operating systems, such as
the various avors of MS Windows [79] [96] [42] [55] and UNIX-based [63] [95] operating
systems. At the same time, as the Internet increased in popularity, many studies emerged,
trying to assess the dependability of the network of networks [56] [75] [80] [85]. The present
decade has witnessed an even broader spectrum of research, adding contributions on virtual
machines [32], applications [88] [25], embedded systems [18] [64], large-scale and parallel
systems [87] [69] [68] [90] and mobile distributed systems [74] [29]. Over the years, many
objectives have been pursued, from the mere statistical classication and modeling of failure
events, to the identication of trends and correlations, and the experimental evaluation of
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Table 2.1: FFDA Research trends: targets and milestones
FFDA Feasibility; evidences 
of load-failure relationship
Operating Systems;
Applications
1980s
Use of FFDA for correlation 
analysis and diagnosis; 
manipulation techniques for 
event logs; uncovering of the 
preeminence of software 
failures; studies on user-
perceived dependability
Operating Systems, 
Applications; Internet; 
Networked Systems
1990s 2000sDecade
Broader spectrum for the 
FFDA research; FFDA used 
to characterize security; 
manipulation techniques for 
novel, complex systems.
Research 
Milestones
Operating Systems; 
Applications; Internet; 
Networked Systems;
Large-scale Systems;
Virtual Machines; Embedded 
and Mobile Systems
Target 
Systems
malicious attacks, such as [37] [35] [24]. Table 2.1 summarizes the trend of the FFDA
research, in terms of targeted systems and milestones. These milestones are then detailed
in sections 2.4.1 and 2.4.2.
About fty high level technical papers, either published by IEEE or ACM journals and
conference proceedings1 over the last three decades, have been taken under consideration.
Fundamental milestones which provoked a signicant shift in the research are analyzed rst.
Relevant FFDA studies, which provided the community with interesting results, are con-
sidered as well. Section 2.5 reports a critical comparison of all considered studies.
1As main sources of our study, we considered the following technical journals: IEEE Transactions on
Computers, IEEE Transactions on Reliability, IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering, IEEE/ACM
Transactions on Networking, ACM Transactions on Computer Systems; and the proceedings of the following
international conferences: the International IEEE Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN),
the International IEEE Symposium on Fault Tolerant Computing (FTCS), the IEEE Symposium on Reliable
Distributed Systems (SRDS), the Pacic Rim International Symposium on Dependable Computing (PRDC),
the IEEE International Symposium on Software Reliability Engineering (ISSRE), the ACM SIGMETRICS
Conference on Measurement and Modeling of Computer Systems.
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2.4.1 Fundamental Research
Over the last three decades, the FFDA research community devoted its eorts to dene
methods, strategies, and techniques for failure data gathering, processing, and analysis.
Several uncoverings and lessons learned are reported in this section. These experiences
traced the path which has then been exploited by other researchers to conduct their studies.
Event Logs Eectiveness, and their Manipulation
Event logs are one of the most adopted failure sources. This is true since the beginning of
eighties, when a pioneer FFDA study [108] achieved a relevant echo for the dependability
research community. It was one of the rst works to demonstrate that FFDA campaigns
based on event logs are a viable approach to derive quantitative measures for system fault
tolerance and recovery management. The gathered information reveals quite ecient for
pinpointing major problem areas where further work could be directed.
An important methodological achievement for event log-based analysis has been the
denition of tuple, as an heuristic for temporal-based coalescence [46]. Other than giving
the fundamentals of tupling, the study in [46] also proposes an experimental sensitivity
analysis, based on event logs from Tandem systems. In addition, authors deeply study the
problem of collisions (dierent errors grouped in the same tuple), proposing a statistical
model of collision probability versus clustering time.
A shift in the research is represented by the work in [16], addressing the analysis of
event logs from 193 DEC VAX/VMS nodes. For the rst time authors propose a critique
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digression on the quality of the logs and how it aects the results, besides the mere analysis
of data. For example, they show that the incorrect handling of bogus timestamps aects
MTTF measures by one order of magnitude. Their conclusions are supported by statisti-
cal analysis performed on one of the largest set of failure data, composed by 2.35 million
events. The same data set is adopted by a subsequent study from the same authors [15]
that, following the wave of its predecessor, does not propose an analysis of failure data, but
it rather discusses ways to improve the analysis of event logs. In particular, the comparative
analysis of dierent tupling schemes has been conducted, by adopting these schemes on real
data. In particular it demonstrates the usefulness of tupling, and evaluates new heuristic
rules by means of sensitivity analysis.
Evidences of the System Load-Failure Relationship
The relationship between failure behavior and system load is clear since the rst FFDA
works. At the beginning of 80s, during a performance measurement campaign for a large
DEC-1OA time-sharing system, it was found that the simplistic assumption of a constant
system failure rate did not agree with measured data [20]. Subsequent research by the
same authors [21] involves use of a doubly stochastic Poisson process to model failures.
The model relates the instantaneous failure rate of a system resource to the usage of the
resource considered. Moved by this research, [51] proposed an approach to evaluate the
relationship between system load and failure behavior that presumes no model a priori, but
rather starts from a substantial body of empirical data. The study was conducted on three
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IBM 370 mainframes, and both failure data (maintenance failure reports) and performance
counters (via a proprietary IBM system) were gathered. A regression analysis of failure
and performance data evidenced the strong correlation between failure manifestation and
system load. A similar approach was followed in [52] on two IBM 370 machines. The anal-
ysis concentrated on CPU failures. In particular, approximately 17 percent of all failures
aecting the CPU were estimated to be permanent. The manifestation of a permanent
failure was found to be strongly correlated with the level and the type of the workload. The
increase in the probability of a failure was found to be most sensitive to a change in the
interactive workload (as measured by the non batch CPU usage, the IO rate and the SVC
rate). Although, in strict terms, the results only relate to the manifestation of permanent
failures and not to their occurrence, there were strong indications that permanent failures
are both caused and discovered by increased activity. This experimental evidence was sup-
ported by more recent studies, such as [36], by means of a fault injection campaign.
Using FFDA for Correlation Analysis, Failure Prediction, and Diagnosis
The information gathered from eld data has been widely recognized as an enabler for cor-
relation and failure prediction, which in turn leads to the possibility of failure diagnosis.
The work in [53] represents a rst eort in this direction, evidencing the feasibility of on-line
diagnosis approaches based on trend analysis and real data. Specically, it concentrates on
the recognition of intermittent failures and denes a methodology to distinguish between
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transient, permanent, and intermittent failures by looking at the correlation between con-
secutive failure events. About 500 groups of failures are identied over a 14 months time
span.
During the same period, [71] proposed a novel failure prediction technique, called
the Dispersion Frame Technique (DFT). The technique is dened by starting from the
statistical characterization of real data observed on a 13 SUN 2/170 nodes, running the
VICE le system, over a 22 months period. By gathering data by both event logs (regarded
as errors) and from operator's failure reports (regarded as failures), authors concentrate of
the identication of error trends which lead to failures. Interestingly, this is the rst FFDA
work which takes into account two dierent data sources at two dierent levels and which
tries to relate them to identify failures root causes and underlying trends. The eectiveness
of the DFT is shown via direct experiments on actual data. In particular, it is shown that
the DFT uses only one fth of the error log entry points required by statistical methods for
failure prediction. Also, the DFT achieves a 93.7% success rate in failure prediction.
Another important work suggests that failure correlation cannot be underestimated.
In other terms this work demonstrates that the common assumption made in dependabil-
ity analysis: \failures in dierent components are independent" is not valid in general
terms [102]. The study analyzes the dependability of 7 DEC VAX machines in a VAX-
cluster. Particular attention is given to the error/failure relationship, and both TBE (time
between errors) and TBF empirical distributions are given. As main results, shared re-
sources are identied as a main dependability bottleneck, and both errors and failures are
shown to occur in bursts. Although the failure correlation is low, it signicantly aects the
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system unavailability estimation.
Software Failures as New Protagonists
In the early 90s, eld failure studies evidenced the preeminence of software failures as main
responsible of system outages. An important study on Tandem systems [45] took a census
of six years of failure data, showing a clear improvement in the reliability of hardware and
maintenance, while indicating the trend of software as the major source of reported outages
(62% in 1990 versus 34% in 1985 whereas hardware-induced outages decreased from 29%
in 1985 down to 7% in 1990). The conclusion was clear: hardware faults and hardware
maintenance were no longer a major source of outages, whereas software related faults
needed to be tolerated. This motivated future research towards software fault tolerance.
Subsequent works emerged in the same period, putting the accent on software failures.
Examples are two studies on the IBM MVS OS, [98] [99].
The rst study considered software failure data collected from the IBM RETAIN (RE-
mote Technical Assistance Information Network) database from 1985 to 1989. However,
since the analysis was performed manually, the total number of reports was sampled down
to 241 reports. The analysis concentrate on a detailed classication and related frequen-
cies of errors (programming mistakes) and triggers (errors circumstances). Results pinpoint
overlay errors, e.g., those related to memory management, to be more severe in terms of
impact than other regular errors. The second work extends the rst one by proposing a
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comparison between OS errors and IMB DB2 and IMS database management systems' er-
rors. Data are collected the same way as the previous study and the same classication
approach is adopted. It's the rst time application related data (e.g., DBMS data) are
considered in an FFDA study.
Lessons Learned on User-Perceived Dependability
An important contribution of FFDA was the recognition of the dierence between the mea-
sured and the user-perceived dependability. Specically, it has been shown how eld studies
may overestimate some dependability gures, resulting into numbers that may mislead the
expectations.
An interesting study in this direction was published in 1999 [55]. The work focuses on
a LAN of Windows NT machines and tries to identify reboot causes by looking at what
authors call \prominent events", i.e., events that preceded the current reboot by no more
than an hour. Authors indicate that while the measured availability of the system was 99
percent, the user-perceived availability was only 92 percent, i.e., the system often can be
alive but not able to provide a required service. The work in [96] reports similar gures (99
percent) on system availability of Windows NT and 2K workstation and servers. The need
to account for the user's perception of system dependability is also stressed in the analysis
of Windows 2000 dependability [79]. The previously mentioned work [55] also proposes a
FSM modeling of error behavior and reports several suggestions to improve the Windows
NT logging system. For example, authors suggest to add a Windows NT shutdown event
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to improve the accuracy in identifying the causes of reboots. This event has actually been
introduced into subsequent versions of the Windows logging systems. Other results are the
evidence that often more than one reboot are needed to restore proper operation (the 60%
of the cases) and that the main responsible for reboots is software (the 90% of the cases).
Using Past Experiences to Improve Next-Generation Products
The essential of eld studies is the possibility of building on the results of the analysis to
propose precise directions of improvement for the next waves of technologies. An exemplary
study was conducted jointly by academy and Microsoft Research on the MS Windows NT
operating system [79]. After reviewing a FFDA conducted on Windows NT 4, authors
move towards the denition of the new features to be added to the next version of the OS,
namely Windows 2000. Just to mention few examples, since the majority of system failures
on Windows NT were due to the core NT system and device drivers, Windows 2000 designers
and developers decided to place as many new features as possible into the user mode, and
to improve the verication of software that resides in the kernel mode, by adopting a new
testing and verication process. Also, OS hangs and the well known \blue screens" due to
application failures were reduced in Windows 2000 through Kernel memory isolation: the
kernel memory space is marked as read-only to user mode applications providing the kernel
greater isolation from errant applications.
The work in [96] conrms the availability improvement of Windows 2000 with respect
to Windows NT. Interestingly, Windows 2000 decreases the number of failures due to the
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core system, and increases application related failures, thus demonstrating the eectiveness
of the kernel memory isolation technique.
2.4.2 FFDA Relevant Studies
FFDA studies had pertained a substantial variety of IT systems and concerns, from Oper-
ating Systems to embedded systems and security, demonstrating the wide recognition for
this kind of research activities. This section summarizes a relevant set of these eorts, with
respect to the system or concern they refer to.
Works on Operating Systems
FFDA's rst steps mainly concerned the evaluation and modeling of Operating Systems
dependability. At the end of eighties, the majority of works were concerned on three popular
operating system families: the IBM MVS, Tandem sytems, and the DEC VAX.
A study dated 1988 addressed the MVS operating system, aiming at building a semi-
markov model of the system from real data by taking into account both normal and error
behavior [48]. A key result of the work was that errors distribution was not simple expo-
nentials. Also, the work was one of the rst to use semi-markov chains for the modeling of
the error behavior. Building on FFDA fundamentals, data were gathered from the operat-
ing system's event logs, and both temporal and content-based coalescence was adopted to
manipulate them. Percentage of failures by failure class also shown a signicant incidence
of software errors: the 36% of errors were due to software, while the rest were hardware
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related (CPU, memory, I/O channels, disk). This result was coherent with the trend of
increasing relevance of software failures, evidenced by Gray two years afterwards [45].
As an example for the Tandem system, [66] dened an analysis methodology for its
event logs through multivariate techniques, such as factor and cluster analysis. The event
logs were gathered from three Tandem systems over a 7 months period. A 2-phase hyper-
exponential distribution was adopted to model the error temporal behavior, according to
the two error behaviors exhibited by the three systems: error bursts and isolated faults.
[110] reports on the validation of an availability model developed for DEC VAX machines
in a VAXcluster. Direct availability measurement of system interruptions from the actual
systems were used to validate the previously dened model. The interesting contribution
is the description of model assumptions that are not supported by the data. In particular,
analysis of the data revealed interruption dependencies across devices (of the same and
dierent type) which were not taken under consideration in the model. Moreover, while
the model assumes exponentially distributed failures, real failure data results to be non-
exponentially distributed.
As a summary of a decade of research, the study in [67] performs a comparison of FFDA
analysis on the three operating systems: the Tandem GUARDIAN fault-tolerant system,
the VAX/VMS distributed system, and the IBM/MVS system. The relevant results are the
following: software errors tend to occur in bursts on both IBM and VAX machines. This is
less pronounced in the Tandem system, which can be attributed to its fault-tolerant design.
The Tandem-system fault-tolerance reduces the service loss due to software failures by a
factor of 10.
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Following the wave of their predecessors, more recent works concerned recent Operating
Systems, such as Unix and Microsoft Windows. The work in [63] propose an interesting and
well conducted FFDA study on a server machine with the Sun SPARC UNIX OS. Starting
from event logs, the work performs a classication of failures and identify the potential
trends of errors which lead to failures. Summary statistics, such as MTBF and availability,
are evaluated.
[42] conrmed the trend of improvement of the Windows OS family, already mentioned
in section 2.4.1. The study address Windows XP SP1, and shows how the percentage of OS
failures decreases from 12% for Windows 2K to the 5% of Windows XP, thus demonstrating
that system crashes are often due to applications and third party software. Dierently from
previous work, this study exploits the Microsoft's Corporate Error Reporting software to
gather failure reports.
Networked Systems Dependability
A natural shift in the FFDA research was represented by the study of networked systems.
As compared to operating systems studies, networked systems studies basically add one
more dimension for the analysis, i.e., the correlation of failures among the system's nodes.
The work in [95] analyzes a LAN of 298 Unix workstations. The analysis concentrates
on the identication of system reboots, via content-based coalescence, on their potential
causes, and on their statistical characteristics, such as uptime, downtime and availability
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statistics. Also, a correlation analysis among logs belonging to dierent machines is per-
formed. The analysis however evidences that there is no high correlation between client and
server failures, as one could expect. This can be explained in part by the fact that errors
aecting the servers persist for a short period of time and thus only clients accessing the
servers when errors occur might be aected.
[112] proposes the analysis of a networked Windows NT system, composed of 503 server
nodes. The study focuses on machine reboots and presents several interesting statistics.
First, the time to failure distribution ts a Weibull distribution. Second, often several re-
boots are needed to restore normal operation. Third, although the availability of individual
server is high (99%), there is a strong indication of correlation between failures in dierent
machines. The correlation was identied through the temporal coalescence of merged event
log les.
Internet Dependability
As the Internet increased in popularity, several studies attempted to characterize its de-
pendability.
The study in [56] presents the results of a 40-days reliability study on a set of 97 popular
Web sites done from an end user's perspective. The interesting aspect of the work is that
it is one of the rst studies where an automated workload is used to acquire the data. In
particular the workload periodically attempts to fetch an HTML le from each Web site
and records the outcome of such attempts. The need for the workload lyes in the spot usage
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of the Internet. Some interesting results of the study are that connectivity problems seem
to play a major role in determining the accessibility of the hosts and that the majority
(70.5%) of the failures are short in time (less than 15 minutes).
[75] attempts to discover and discuss Ethernet anomalies from the Carnegie Mellon
University network using an ethological approach. Traces of network trac are collected
by means of a hardware monitor deployed on the network. The major result is the ability
to classify the network behavior as normal and anomalous.
An interesting study attempts to characterize the pathological behavior of end-to-end
Internet routing [85]. The study reports on an analysis of 40,000 end-to-end route mea-
surements conducted by means of automated workload (repeated \traceroutes" between 37
Internet sites). Authors analyze the routing behavior for pathological conditions, uncovering
the prevalence of routing loops, erroneous routing, infrastructure failures, and temporary
outages. Coherently with the increasing complexity of the Internet, the likelihood of en-
countering a major routing pathology resulted more than doubled between the end of 1994
and the end of 1995, rising from 1.5% to 3.4%.
From a study of 62 user-visible failures in three largescale Internet services, [80] observes
that front-ends are a more signicant problem than is commonly believed. In particular,
operator error and network problems are shown to be leading contributors to user-visible
failures.
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Large Scale Systems
Recent studies attempted to study large scale server environments and complex parallel
machines [87] [68]. Analysis of event logs from about 400 parallel server machines with the
AIX operating system [87] demonstrates that although improvements in system robustness
continue to limit the number of actual failures to a very small fraction of the recorded
errors, the failure rates are still signicant and highly variable. A subsequent work from
the same authors deeply studies the logs from a production IBM BlueGene/L system and
proposes empirical failure prediction methods which can predict around 80% of the memory
and network failures, and 47% of the application I/O failures [68]. Prediction is very useful
to on-line system diagnosis: with these prediction schemes deployed online, one is able to
eectively predict failures in the future, and possibly take remedial actions to mitigate the
adverse impacts that these failures would cause.
A very recent study analyzes failure data recently made publicly available by one of the
largest high-performance computing (HPC) sites [90]. The data has been collected over
the past 9 years at Los Alamos National Laboratory and includes 23000 failures recorded
on more than 20 dierent systems, mostly large clusters of SMP and NUMA nodes. To
date, this is the largest set of failure data studied in the literature, both in terms of the
time-period it spans, and the number of systems and processors it covers. This underline
the importance of having public failure data repositories available to researches for analysis.
We hope this example encourages eorts at other sites to collect and clear data for public
release. Specically, the study classies failures occurrences and models failure times (with
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weibull and gamma distributions) and recovery times (with the lognormal distribution). It
is shown that failure and recovery rates vary widely across systems. Moreover, it results
that the curve of the failure rate over the lifetime of an HPC system is often very dierent
from the traditional bath-tube curve.
Over the last few years, it has been recognized how FFDA studies can be signicant for
a wider set of systems and concerns. The three following sections report on FFDA stud-
ies on applications, virtual machines, embedded systems, and measurement-based security
characterization.
Applications and Virtual Machines
In [25] Chillarege et al concentrate on failure reports from two widely distributed IBM
software products. The analysis did not target event logs, rather it started from the service
calls made by customers. Once evaluated by an experts team, the calls may result in
new APARs (Authorized Failure Analysis Report) which are then analyzed by the software
maintenance sta. As an interesting result, author dene and evaluate two novel metrics,
the fault weight and the failure window, which are demonstrated to be proportional to the
qualitative fault severity and that can be used to control the failure reporting process at a
costumer base.
A very recent study characterizes the dependability of the Java Virtual Machine starting
from Bug Databases, the only public available failure data source for the JVM to date [32].
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The study proposes a detailed classication and analysis of bug reports. In particular, key
results are: JVM built-in error detection mechanisms are not capable of detect a consider-
able amount of failures (45.03%); a non-negligible percentage of reported failures indicate
the presence of aging-related bugs inside the JVM; and the JVM is not expected to achieve
the same level of dependability on dierent platforms.
Works on Embedded Systems
The work in [18] analyzes the dependability of mobile robots, based on failure reports
gathered on 673 hours of actual usage by 13 robots and three manufacturers. It appears
that mobile robots, in a given hour, have a 5.5% probability of failure. The reliability is
very low, with an average MTBF of about 8 hours and an availability lower than 50%.
As expected, eld robots have higher failure rates and overall lower reliability than indoor
robots, possibly because of the demands of the outdoor terrains and the relative newness
of the platforms. The eectors, or platform itself, was the source of most failures for eld
robots whereas the biggest failure in indoor robots was with the wireless communication
link.
A analysis of data on 11 years operating experience of safety critical software for nuclear
reactors is presented in [64]. The study is conducted by Technicatome, a French company
specialized in the design of nuclear reactors of the submarines and aircraft carriers for the
French Navy. Several conclusions can be drawn from the study. In particular authors state
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that the analysis of data on operating experience is an ecient mean to improve the devel-
opment processes, and emergent methods, such as formal methods, would have been of little
help to prevent the errors actually encountered in operation, since they concern HW/SW
interactions and real-time issues extremely dicult to model. In fact, as it is very dicult
to reproduce the real load and asynchronous situations in a laboratory environment, some
very particular situations can only be encountered in a life-size trial.
Using Field Data to Characterize Security
As the scope of FFDA campaigns reached the security community, several works appeared
which attempted to characterize and to model system vulnerabilities and attacks starting
from eld data. An outstanding example is represented by the Honeynet project [76]. A
honeypot can be regarded as an information system resource whose value lies in unautho-
rized or illicit use of that resource. By placing honeypots on the Internet and by gathering
data on the malicious activity aecting them, one can study the characteristics of attacks
and system vulnerabilities. As an example, the study in [37] aimed at using data collected
by honeypots to validate fault assumptions required when designing intrusion-tolerant sys-
tems. Authors set up three machines equipped with dierent operating systems (Windows
NT and 2K, and Red Hat Linux) and collected network-related data (via tcpdump) for four
months to analyze the source of attacker and the attacked ports. The work evidenced that,
in most cases, attackers know in advance which ports are open on each machine, without
performing any port scan. Moreover, there were no substantial dierences in the attacks
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made on dierent operating systems.
A similar study analyzes malicious activity collected from a testbed, consisting of two
Windows 2K target computers dedicated solely to the purpose of being attacked, over a
109 day time period [35]. The objective was to determine the characteristics of collected
attacks data that most eciently separate attacks, allowing their statistical classication.
Ethereal was used to collect the data, and ltering techniques were adopted. Clustering
is then used to identify the most accurate characteristics for separating attacks. Results
show that these characteristics are the number of bytes constituting the attack, the mean
of the distribution of bytes as a function of the number of packets, and the mean of the
distribution of message lengths as a function of the number of packets. This work hence
demonstrate how eld data represent an useful mean to recognize attacks.
The work in [24] exploits data from the Bugtraq database and proposes a classication of
vulnerabilities. In particular, vulnerabilities are dominated by ve categories: input valida-
tion errors (23%), boundary condition errors (21%), design errors (18%), failure to handle
exceptional conditions (11%), and access validation errors (10%). The primary reason for
the domination of these categories is that they include the most prevalent vulnerabilities,
such as buer overow and format string vulnerabilities. Starting from this data and helped
by code ispections, authors propose nite state machine models for vulnerabilities, which
help to better understand their behavior and/or to uncover new ones.
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Recent Contributions on Filtering and Manipulation
Over the last two years, we witnessed some eort in the direction of dening new techniques
for processing eld failure data. This is mainly due to the new diculties which arise with
emerging systems.
[69] denes a new and eective ltering method for the IBM BlueGene/L event logs.
Eective ltering is a very desirable characteristic for these large-scale complex systems,
since many log entries are produced and stored. Authors demonstrated how their ltering
strategy can remove over the 99.96% of entries from a event log gathered from a IBM
BlueGene/L prototype. This represents a valid shift with respect to the previous methods,
where a 91.82% ltering eectiveness were reached.
The work proposed in [88] denes a novel failure prediction method, called Similar Events
Prediction (SEP), which is based on the recognition of failure-prone patterns utilizing a
semi-Markov chain in combination with clustering. Dierently from previous approaches,
SEP takes into account more information about the current system state. In addition, SEP
investigates properties of the error event itself such as the type of error message, the soft-
ware component that reported the event or the depth of the stack trace. The technique is
compared to a straightforward prediction method based on a well-known reliability model
and to the Dispersion Frame Technique (DFT) by Lin and Siewiorek. All three models have
been applied to data of a complex commercial telecommunication system. Predictive power
of the approaches is compared in terms of precision, recall, F-measure and accumulated
runtime costs. SEP outperformed the other failure prediction techniques in all measures.
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Figure 2.3: FFDA purposes a) break-up, b) distribution over the years
2.5 Comparison
In this section the wide body of research previously presented is compared with respect to
the evaluation means for FFDA dened in section 2.3.
2.5.1 Purposes and Target Systems
Figure 2.3a reports a break-up of the purposes followed by the analyzed FFDA studies. As
one can expect, the majority of works (66%) performs mere practical studies, addressing
a particular system and presenting failure classication, stochastic model, statistical distri-
butions, and dependability measures. A signicant amount of works (26%) are devoted to
the denition of new methods and techniques for improving FFDA campaigns. It should be
noted, however, that, while the number of dependability studies have been increasing over
the years, the number of theoretical eorts greatly decreased, if compared with the practical
ones (see gure 2.3b). This indicates that the methodological results achieved in the past
are still used to conduct today's studies. However, this may not be the case of emerging
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technologies, where the specic constraints and the complexity of the architectures requires
new research eorts. For instance, this applies to mobile distributed systems, due to their
specicity and resource-constrained characteristics, and to COTS-based software, where
the complexity of the interactions along with the absence of any built-in, standard logging
scheme, makes it hard to collect the proper data and to generalize the results. Finally,
a reduced fraction of works (8%) presents comparisons among various studies, evidencing
similarities and dierences in the results.
Comparisons are the proof of a certain level of maturity achieved in a particular eld. So
far, comparisons have been proposed only for studies addressing Operating Systems, which
are the most studied target system, as gure 2.4a evidences. Operating Systems account
indeed for the 55% of the analyzed systems. The 16% are applications, including virtual
machines, and embedded systems, whereas the 13% characterized Internet services, also
from a security point of view. Finally, the 16% of works addressed large scale systems and
networked systems. As a matter of fact, there are no signicant studies so far in the litera-
ture addressing MDSs2. Figure 2.4b shows how the variety of FFDA targets increased over
2Works [27][29][3] are excluded from the comparison, since, although they address MDSs, they are from
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the years: from works mainly addressing Operating Systems in the eighties, to works also
concerning applications, Internet servics, large-scale and networked systems in the present
decade.
2.5.2 Academic vs Industrial Works
Figure 2.5 reports the break-up of industrial and academic works. Although the academy
played an important role for the FFDA research (66% of works), a signicant eort has been
also profused from industry (21%), as a conrmation that FFDA is a valuable instrument
for industries to improve their businesses. Collaborative works from academy and industry
are still a little slice of the total number of works (13%). However, more sinergy between the
two actors would improve the overall quality of FFDA works, which could benet from the
academy experience and methods from a side, and industry's real data from another side.
This is also conrmed by gure 2.6, where it can be noticed how industry works scarcely
adopt the manipulation strategies dened in the literature (e.g., ltering, coalescence and
so on), dierently from what the academia does.On the other hand, collaborative works
usually exploit more the existing techniques.
the same author of the present dissertation. Actually, their development also arised from the consideration
that there are no FFDA experiences on MDSs in the literature.
Chapter 2. Field Failure Data Analysis: Methodology and Related Work 66
Number of data manipulation strategies per actor
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
o
f 
w
o
rk
s
Figure 2.6: Number of adopted FFDA manipulation strategies, per actor; the percentages are
normalized for each actor
network 
monitoring
10%
Mixed
5%
Failure Reports
33%
Event Logs
52% 1
60%
2
28%
3
10%
5
2%
(a) (b)
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2.5.3 Methodological Considerations
In this section, a comparison of the related work is conducted according to the FFDA
methodology introduced in 2.2. The purpose is to summarize trends and best practices
emerged from three decades of FFDA research.
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Data Logging and Collection
The pie chart in gure 2.7a shows a break-up of the data sources adopted by the considered
FFDA studies. In particular, the adopted sources are, in a descending order: event logs
(52%), failure reports (33%), and network monitoring (10%), i.e., the sning of the network
trac. Only a small fraction of the related work (5%) uses data coming from more than one
source, hence the common practice is to use a single data source. Another consideration
is that the considered failure data often come from internal sources (70% of cases). Only
the 30% of studies adopts data provided by third party organizations or companies. This
indicates the diculty of nding publicly available data sources.
As shown in gure 2.7b, the 60% of works uses data captured at a single level, even if a
single data source (i.e., one event log) can be sucient to capture failure data at dierent
machine levels (hardware, operating system, network, middleware, application software,
and human interface). The trend of using failure data belonging to more than one level is
increasing over the years (see gure 2.8). This is basically due the increased complexity
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Table 2.2: Adopted failure data level as a percentage of the total number of analyzed FFDA studies;
percentages do not add to 100, since there are studies using data from more than one level
23%Network
PercentageLevel
5%Middleware, human
35%Hardware
26%Application
69%Operating System
of systems which in turn requires more data to be captured at dierent levels to build a
thorough understanding of system's faulty behavior. As for the type of level these failure
data account for, table 2.2 reports on the frequency of each level, with respect to the total
number of analyzed studies. For example, the 69% of studies uses data coming from the
Operating System level. This is coherent with the fact that the majority of studies adopts
event logs, and targets Operating Systems.
Finally, it is important to note that almost all the considered studies (the 95%) con-
sider failure data captured from systems with idle workloads. Hence, the common FFDA
practice suggests to use idle workloads. Not surprisingly, the studies that adopt automated
workloads are concerned with the Internet, which spot usage does not always permit to use
idle workloads.
Data Filtering and Manipulation
Data manipulation is an important step of FFDA studies. However, as evidenced in table
2.3, a signicant fraction of the analyzed studies (38%) do not perform any manipulation
on the gathered data. This specially applies to industry works, as previulsly mentioned.
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Table 2.3: Percentages of usage of FFDA ltering and manipulation strategies
7.69Temporal coalescence, Content-based coalescence
7.69Filtering, Temporal coalescence
5.13Temporal coalescence (merged logs from more nodes)
10.26Content-based coalescence
12.82Temporal coalescence
38.46Not performed
PercentageManipulation Straregies
2.56Filtering, Temporal coalescence, Content-based coalescence
15.38Filtering
Data ltering and temporal coalescence are the most common practices, adopted by more
of the 30% of works. The table also indicates that there are works performing the temporal
coalescence on merged log les from dierent nodes. This is the case of studies of networked
systems, to discover failure propagation phenomena among nodes. Finally, only the 18%
of works performs more than one manipulation on the same data, such as ltering and
coalescence.
Data Analysis
To have an understanding on the nature of performed studies, table 2.4 reports a summary
of the type of conducted analysis per study. The crosses signed on each row evidences
the types of analysis, and the percentage of works conducting such analysis. A signicant
amount of works (33%) performs only the classication of the failures which emerge from
the eld data. This is especially true for investigation works, i.e., the rst works address-
ing a particular class of system or pursuing a particular objective. Almost one half of the
studies produces more than one type of analysis on the data. Among them, about the 10%
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Table 2.4: Percentages of types of conducted data analysis
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performs the classication of failures, their modeling, and correlation analysis. These three
types of analysis are inherently correlated: the classication is often needed to produce
models (note that the majority of modeling works also perform classications), and the
models are then used for correlation analysis, such as trend analysis.
2.5.4 Quality of Conducted Campaigns
The quantitative dimension dened in section 2.3.2, along with the indication of the con-
dence on collected data, give us a mean to evaluate the quality of conducted FFDA cam-
paigns.
From the considered studies, it results that the average density is 1665 items/month,
against an average length of the experiments of 25 months. This means that the experiments
are conducted on about 40000 data items, on average. Although these gures seem to be
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Table 2.5: Percentiles of the Density of FFDA studies
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Figure 2.9: FFDA studies density-length relationship
reasonable, a look at the density's percentiles (see table 2.5) evidences that the 50% of
works exhibit densities which are lower than 106 items/month. In other terms, several
works are concerned with systems which experience a little amount of failures in time. For
these systems, longer experiments should be performed. However, this is not always the
case, as shown in gure 2.9. Even if the trend is to perform short experiments for high
densities and long experiments for low densities, there is still a signicant amount of works
(48%) exhibiting low densities and short lengths, as indicated in the gure.
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For the 31% of works it has not been possible to evaluate the density at all, either because
the lenght of the experiment, or the number of data items have not been made available by
authors. As for the condence measures, only the 26% of the considered studies explicitly
provides its indication, whereas the 13% furnishes a partial indication, i.e., only on a fraction
of the considered data. However, this does not represent an issue for classication studies.
Overall, the quality of conducted experiments can be rated as acceptable. However,
the considerations given in this section can be taken into account when conducting future
studies, hence improving the quality of future FFDA research.
2.6 FFDA of MDSs: Issues and Challenges
The seek for answers on the dependabilty of MDSs, and the lack of eld data on them,
as evidenced in section 2.5.1, call for the conduction of FFDA studies on these systems.
Recently, some rst eort has been conducted towards this direction. The work in [74],
proposes a FFDA for a wireless telecommunication system, along with the analysis of failure
and recovery rates is discussed. However, the failure data are relative to the xed core
entities (base stations) of a cellular telephone system. [39] reports on a collection of
user-perceived failure data from Bluetooth piconets, in order to give a qualitative failures
characterization of Bluetooth-enabled devices. The work denes a set of dierent test-cases
which have been applied to a variety of Bleutooth devices. Nevertheless, as also authors
stated, the results are not purely scientic in that they have no statistical signicance. More
eort is thus needed. Anyway, new issues and challenges arise when applying the FFDA
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methodology to MDSs.
As a MDS is composed of a set of mobile devices linked together via wireless communi-
cation means, partial FFDA studies should at least address either the wireless technology
or the mobile devices. The following challenging questions are related to the former:
 Which data source can be adopted? Failure reports are to be discarder, since there
are no publicly available eld data on wireless infrastructure, to our knowledge. A
possible solution can be event logs, but are we sure that they are able to capture the
overall failing behavior of a communication technology? Perhaps, some failure causes
lye at the channel level, which cannot be captured by the Operating System's logging
facilities. These data can however be gathered via network monitoring. Hence, a
mixed approach is needed, able to gather and correlate data from multiple sources.
Nevertheless, little experience has been matured on FFDA with mixed sources (the
5% of studied works).
 Can we use idle workloads? Wireless channels are generally used in a spot way: the
mobility of users and the limited capacity of radio links harden the task of measuring
dependability parameters. Dependability continuous-time measures, such as MTBF
and MTTR, require the system to be active 24/7 to be properly estimated. Hence,
automated workloads should be deployed on actual nodes, to force a 24/7 utilization of
the infrastructure. Once again, there poor experience has been achieved about FFDA
with automated workloads (the 5% of related work), thus more eort is required in
this direction.
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The situation gets even worse in the case of mobile devices. In particular, the following
open issues arise:
 How to collect the failure data? Due to their specicity constraints, mobile devices
generally do not provide any built-in logging facility. Even if some instrument is
dened, they are used by manufacturers during the development process. As an
example, the Symbian OS for smartphones oers a particular server (the ogger)
allowing an application to log its information. Yet, to access the logged data of a
generic X system/application module it is necessary to create a particular directory,
with a well dened name (e.g. Xdir). The problem is that the names of such directories
are not made publicly available. It is indeed undesirable for manufacturers to publish
their sensible failure data. Hence, ad-hoc logging mechanisms have to be designed,
dealing with mobile devices constraints and specicities.
 Where do we have to start from? Failure modes of a typical wireless communication
mean have already been hypothesized. Examples are connectivity failures, packet
losses, and network partitions. Unfortunately, this is not the case for mobile devices,
where there is no substantial knowledge on the failure nature. This knowledge cannot
be underestimated because, if a logging mechanism is to be built, one should at least
know when and how to register a failure event.
The following two chapters try to answer the above mentioned questions, with reference
to Bluetooth PANs and Symbian OS smart phones. These chapters are the result of a three
years experience, and partially extend previously published results, as [27][29][3].
You always admire what you really
don't understand.
Blaise Pascal
Chapter 3
FFDA of Bluetooth Personal Area
Networks
The Bluetooth wireless technology is nowadays widespread adopted in a variety of portable devices.
In particular, the Bluetooth Personal Area Network (PAN) feature oers IP support over Bluetooth,
thus expanding the model of personal communications to provide connectivity and Internet access to
and between heterogeneous devices. However, the dependability level of this widely used technology
is still unknown.
This chapter presents a failure data analysis campaign on Bluetooth Personal Area Networks (PANs)
conducted on two kinds of heterogeneous testbeds (working for more than one year). The obtained
results reveal how failures distributions are characterized and suggest how to improve the dependabil-
ity of Bluetooth PANs.
3.1 Rationale and Characterization of the FDDA Campaign
As demonstrated in recent works, the utilization of Bluetooth as a \last meter" access net-
work, represents an opportunistic and cost-eective way to improve the connection avail-
ability of the wide-spread existing 802.11 networks [44, 54]. A signicant research quest
is to assess whether the Bluetooth technology represents a good candidate for develop-
ing mission- or business-critical wireless-based systems. Another interesting quest is to
evaluate how Bluetooth meets everyday dependability needs for the consumer-electronic
mass-market. To this aim, it is necessary to quantitatively evaluate dependability gures
75
Chapter 3. FFDA of Bluetooth Personal Area Networks 76
and to investigate possible fault tolerance means for improving the overall dependability
level.
However, the conduction of a FFDA campaign on a wireless communication infrastruc-
ture cannot be performed notwithstanding the specicity of the technology and its dierent
scope, as compared to operating systems and applications. Hence, as just mentioned in
previous chapter, two challenging questions arise when targeting wireless communication
technologies:
 Which data source can be adopted?
 Can we use idle workloads?
As regarded to rst question, it has been previously argued that there are no publicly
available failure reports for this kind of systems, while event logs alone cannot assure that
all the relevant information is gathered. Most of the failure causes lyes indeed in the volatile
nature of the wireless channel, those behavior can hardly be captured by operating system's
event logs only. For this reason, a mixed approach is preferred, capable to collect failure-
related information from more than one source. Specically, the analysis on Bluetooth
PANs presented in this chapter, is based on failure data collected at three levels: application
level (via application logs), operating system level (via OS event logs), and channel level (by
means of a Bluetooth channel snier). The relationships between data at the dierent levels
allows for a deep understanding of the failure phenomenology, failure causes, and vertical
failure propagation, from the channel, up to applications. More in detail, the collected
multi-level data permits to obtain the following results:
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 The denition of a detailed failure model of Bluetooth PANs, in terms of i) the classi-
cation of the failures aecting the applications, ii) the identication of their statistical
distributions, which are lognormal for the majority of failure classes, iii) the investiga-
tion of possible low level causes of the failures, and iv) the study of failures distribution
as Bluetooth channel utilization changes, in order to identify usage patterns that have
to be avoided to develop more robust applications.
 The characterization of the self-robustness of Bluetooth wireless channels with respect
to faults aecting the radio channels. Low level communication faults are classied,
and measures of the coverage of the Bluetooth low level protocols, in terms of the
percentage of errors which are detected and corrected, are performed. In particular,
a four nine coverage is discovered, demonstrating a good level of self-robustness.
 The improvement of the dependability level of Bluetooth PANs. To this extent, the
failure model is used, that is, for each observed failure, we infer its sources. Then, we
try to identify the most eective recovery action and, in some cases, we are able to
apply error masking strategies by completely eliminating some failures from occurring.
As for the second question, it is desirable to adopt 24/7 automated workloads for several
reasons. First, dependability continuous-time measures, such as the Time Between Failures
(MTBF) and the Time To Recover (MTTR), require the system to be active 24/7 to be
properly estimated. Second, due to the intrinsic characteristics of mobile infrastructures,
mobile terminals are generally used in a spot way, dierently from server farms or net-
worked systems for which an idle workload is sucient, as observed in section 2.5. Third, a
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continuously operating workload well represents all those critical scenarios where the wire-
less infrastructure is required to operate continuously, such as remote control of robots, or
video-surveillance.
The design of such a 24/7 automated workload plays a crucial role in our analysis, since,
as evidenced in section 2.4.1, there is a strong correlation between workloads and failure
behavior. To this aim, two classes of workloads have been realized. The rst class stimu-
lates Bluetooth channels via completely random workloads in order to study the Bluetooth
Channel behavior irrespective of the specic networked application being used. This let us
identify good/bad usage patterns that should be adopted/avoided to realize more robust
applications. The second class uses more realistic workloads of traditional IP-based appli-
cation (i.e., Web, streaming, and Peer-to-peer), adopting the trac models as published in
recent works on this research eld. This workload allows to characterize the dependability
of traditional networked applications using Bluetooth PAN as a last-meter access network.
Table 3.1 summarizes the characteristics of the FFDA campaign, according to the frame-
work introduced in section 2.3. As can be observed from the table, the study is signicant
from several perspectives: it achieves a variety of interesting results, it benets from an
high density, and it performs a signicant amount of analysis.
The rest of the chapter deeply describes the data collection methodology and the re-
sults obtained from the FFDA campaign. Such results complete our previous eort in this
direction [27][29].
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Table 3.1: Characterization of the study conducted on Bluetooth PANs
Analysis of Bluetooth PANs
ValueDimension
Filtering, spatial coalescence, temporal 
coalescence (from merged log files)
Manipulation
Automated (random and realistic)Workload
Channel, OS, ApplicationLevels
Application logs, System logs, network monitoringData Source
Classification, Dependability measurements, 
Modeling, Correlation
Analysis
YesConficence
20967 items/monthDensity
377405Data Items
18 monthsLength
Definition of a failure model, Failure propagation 
and causes,  Bluetooth self-robustness, definition 
of masking and recovery strategies.
Achieved Results
Bluetooth PANsTarget System
InternalSource
AcademyActor
Dependability StudyPurpose
2006Date
3.2 Bluetooth Background
Bluetooth [12], BT in the following, is a short-range wireless technology operating in the
2.4 GHz ISM band. The BT system provides both point-to-point and point-to-multipoint
wireless connections. Two or more units sharing the same channel form a piconet. One BT
unit acts as the master of the piconet, whereas the other unit(s) acts as slave(s). Up to
seven slaves can be active in the piconet.
Applications running on BT-enabled devices use a common set of data-link protocols, the
BT core protocols, which are described in the following.
 Baseband : this layer enables the physical RF link between BT units forming a piconet.
It provides two dierent physical links, Synchronous Connection-Oriented (SCO) and
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Asynchronous Connectionless (ACL). The channel is divided into time slots, each 625
s in length. A BT ACL data packet may occupy 1, 3, or 5 consecutive time slots.
Packets consist of a 72-bit access code for piconet identication and synchronization, a
18 bit header, and a variable length payload. The header contains a header error check
(HEC) to check the header integrity. If the HEC does not check, the entire packet
is disregarded. The payload consists of three segments: a payload header, a payload
and a Cyclic Redundancy Code (CRC) for error detection. The 16 bits CRC-CCITT
polynomial g(x) = x16 + x12 + x5 + 1 is adopted, irrespective of the payload size (i.e.,
from 1 up to 5 slots), which is able to catch all single and double errors, all errors with
an odd number of bits, and all burst errors of length 16 bits or less. It however may
fail to detect burst errors which are longer than 16 bits in length, such as 17 bits bursts
(with 99.997% coverage) and 18 bits or longer bursts (with 99.998% coverage). In DMx
packets (where x is the number of consecutive slots, i.e. 1, 3, and 5), the payload is also
coded with shortened Hamming code, in order to perform Forward Error Correction
(FEC). DHx packets are instead uncoded. Baseband performs error correction via an
ARQ (Automatic Repeat Request) retransmission method. According to this scheme,
packets with invalid CRC are retransmitted until an acknowledgment is received or a
certain timeout expires.
 Link Manager Protocol (LMP): the LMP is responsible for connection establishment
between BT devices, including security aspects, such as authentication and encryption.
It also provides BT devices with the inquiry/scan procedure.
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 Logical Link Control and Adaptation Protocol (L2CAP): this layer provides connection-
oriented and connectionless data services, including multiplexing capabilities, seg-
mentation/reassembly operations, and group abstractions. Error correction and ow
control are not performed at this layer since the Baseband channel is assumed, by
Bluetooth designers, to be reliable.
 Service Discovery Protocol (SDP): using SDP, device information, services, and char-
acteristics of services can be retrieved.
The BT specication also denes a Host Controller Interface (HCI), which provides devel-
opers with an API to access the hardware and to control registers of baseband controller
and link manager.
The communication between a BT Host and a Host Controller takes place via either
UART or RS232 protocols over serial channels, such as the Universal Serial Bus (USB).
Recently, the BlueCore Serial Protocol (BCSP) has been adopted on some devices, such
as Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs). It provides a more sophisticated option than its
predecessors. BCSP carries a set of parallel information ows between the host and the
controller, multiplexing them over a single UART link, and it adds error checking and
retransmission.
BT piconets are highly dynamic, with devices appearing and disappearing. For this
reason, the BT core specication provides automatic discovery and conguration. Several
stages must be completed before BT service can be used: i) Find the device (Inquiry);
ii) Connect to the device (Page); iii) Discover what services the device supports (Service
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Figure 3.1: The Bluetooth Protocol Stack and the PAN prole
Discovery Protocol- SDP); iv) Decide what service to connect to and nd out how to connect
to it (SDP); and v) connect to the service.
The focus of this study is on the use of IP over a BT piconet. The BT Special Interest
Group dened the PAN prole, that provides support for common networking protocols
such as IPv4 and IPv6. The PAN prole exploits the BT Network Encapsulation Protocol
(BNEP) to encapsulate IP packets into L2CAP packets and to provide the Ethernet ab-
straction. BNEP does not provide any integrity check mechanism for its header. When the
PAN prole is used, the master/slave switch role operation assumes a key role. A PAN User
(PANU) willing to connect to a Network Access Point (NAP) becomes the master since it
initiates the connection. As soon as the connection is established at L2CAP level, a switch
is performed, because it is important that the NAP remains the master of the piconet in
order to handle up to seven PANUs.
Figure 3.1 gives an overall picture of the described protocols.
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3.3 Data Collection Methodology
This section provides the needed insight into the data collection methodology adopted for
the Bluetooth FFDA campaign, according to the typical steps of the FFDA methodology,
dened in 2.2.
3.3.1 Testbed and Workload Description.
Two testbeds are deployed, composed of actual machines equipped with BT antennas. In
order to directly face the intrinsic nature of mobile infrastructure, emulation workloads
run on every node of the testbeds. As already introduced, two types of workloads are
considered: a totally random workload, so as to stimulate Bluetooth protocols and channels
in a uniform way and to identify good/bad usage patterns, and a realistic workload, in
order to characterize the dependability behavior of common networked applications when
used over BT radio links. Testbeds' topology is shown in gure 3.2. According to the PAN
prole, the master node (Giallo) is congured as a NAP to accept incoming connections from
slaves, running PANU applications. The workload, called BlueTest, runs on all the nodes, in
particular BlueTest clients on PANUs, and a BlueTest server on the NAP. Both the actual
testbeds obey to the same hardware and software congurations, i.e. they are composed of
7 devices, 1 master (the NAP) and 6 slaves (the PANUs). To let results be independent on
specic hardware platforms or operating systems, the testbed is composed of heterogeneous
nodes, ranging from several commodity PCs, with dierent hardware congurations and
OSs, to PDAs. Table 3.2 summarizes technical characteristics of the adopted machines.
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on boardBlueZ 2.10XScale 400Mhz/32Mb Zaurus SL-5600
2.4.18-rmk7-pxa3-embedixOpen Zaurus 3.5.2 LinuxZaurus SL-5600
Anycom CC3030BlueZ 2.10P4 1.60GHz/128Mb Giallo 
3COM 3CREB96BBlueZ 2.10P3 350Mhz/256Mb Verde
Belkin F8T003BlueZ 2.10Celeron 700Mhz/128Mb Miseno
Digicom PalladioBlueZ 2.10P3 350MHz/256Mb Azzurro
Sitecom CN-500BroadcommP4 1.80Ghz/512Mb Win
on boardBlueZ 2.10StrongARM 206 MHz/64Mb Ipaq H3870 
BT HardwareBT StackCPU/RAMHost
Service Pack 2MS Windows XPWin
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Figure 3.2: The topology of both the Bluetooth testbeds, along with the technical details of their
machines
Linux machines use the standard BlueZ stack1, whereas the Windows ones are equipped
with Service Pack 2 and use the BroadCom stack2. Note that the native Windows BT Stack
could not be used because it does not oer any API for the PAN prole (in Windows XP, IP
facilities over Bluetooth are provided only via point-to-point RFCOMM3 connection). All
the machines are equipped with Class 2 BT devices, i.e., up to 10 meters communication
range. Other than active nodes running the BlueTest, also a passive Snier node is present.
The snier is equipped with two BT dongles, and with a commercial software for sning BT
packets over the air. The Snier is equipped with Windows XP and it uses the Windows'
SP2 Bluetooth stack. In order to reduce hardware aging phenomena, the two testbed have
been totally replaced by new ones (having the same conguration), in the middle of the
testing period. The PANUs' BT antennas have been placed at several dierent distances
from the NAP's antenna (e.g. 0.5m, 5m, and 7m, see gure 3.2), in order to evaluate the
1The Ocial Linux Bluetooth protocol stack, http://www.bluez.org
2Broadcom is a commercial implementation of the BT Stack for Windows, http://www.broadcom.com
3Serial Cable Emulation Protocol
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Figure 3.3: State-chart Diagram of the Bluetooth Workload
failure distribution as a function of the distance. Antenna positions are xed, hence we
collect data about xed PAN topologies. However, this is representative of real cases in
which PANs are built among computers on a desk.
The BlueTest workload (WL) emulates the operations that can be made by a real BT
user utilizing PAN applications. Each BlueTest cycle consists of common BT utilization
phases, as summarized in the state-chart diagram of gure 3.3. It rst executes an in-
quiry/scan procedure to discover devices in the environment, then it searches the Network
Access Point (NAP) service via a SDP Search operation. Once the NAP has been found,
the Bluetest client connects to it (by creating a BNEP channel on top of a L2CAP con-
nection), switches the role to slave (to let the NAP to be the master of the piconet), uses
the wireless link by transfering data to its counterpart (the Bluetest server), and nally
it disconnects. Before starting a new cycle, the BlueTest client waits for a random time,
which can be thought as a user passive o time, modeled according to a Pareto distribution,
coherently to previous work [34]. To add uncertainty to the piconet evolution, each WL
cycle is characterized by several random variables: i) S, scan ag, if true, an inquiry/scan
operation is performed; ii) SDP , service discovery ag, if true, a SDP search is performed;
Chapter 3. FFDA of Bluetooth Personal Area Networks 86
iii) B, the Baseband packet type; iv) N , the number of packets to be sent/received; v)
LS/LR, the size of sent/received packets; and vi) TW , the passive o waiting time. S and
SDP are introduced since real BT applications do not perform inquiry/scan procedures or
SDP searches every time they run. It is possible to exploit caching of the recently discov-
ered devices or services. For each WL cycle, values for S and SDP are chosen according
to the uniform distribution, since the lack of publicly available information about the real
utilization pattern of inquiry/scan procedures and SDP searches for a typical PANU appli-
cation. B, N , LS , and LR parameters depend on the channel utilization, as described in
the following.
Random WL. It generates totally random values for B, N , LS , and LR. In particular,
B is randomly chosen among the six BT packet types (i.e. DMx or DHx), according to a
binomial distribution. This helps to `stimulate' the channel with every packet types. N ,
LS , and LR are generated following uniform distributions, for the same reasons. To let us
analyze the integrity state of packets as they are received by PANUs and the NAP, the
random WL uses the User Datagram Protocol (UDP). More details on this WL can be
found in our previous work [27].
Realistic WL. It generates values for the parameters according to the random processes
which are used to model actual Internet trac [34, 41]. In particular, the choice for B is left
to the BT Stack, whereas N follows power law distributions (e.g. the Pareto distribution)
related to the dimension of the resource that have to be transferred. The parameters of the
distributions are set with respect to the application being emulated (e.g. Web browsing,
le transfer , e-mail, peer to peer, video and audio streaming). Values for LS and LR are
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set according to the actual Protocol Data Unit, commonly adopted for the various trans-
port protocols over the Internet [41] (e.g. 572 or 1500 bytes for the Transmission Control
Protocol - TCP, 825 bytes for the Real-time Transport Protocol - RTP, 40 bytes for ac-
knowledgment packets [41]). Hence the WL adopts TCP, except from streaming trac,
where UDP is used. Finally, since a user can run more applications in sequence over the
same connection, the WL runs from 1 up to 20 consecutive cycles over the same connection.
Finally, the behavior of the WL may slightly change from an application to another. For
example, streaming applications only receive data (that is, LS = 0), whereas the other
applications, which use TCP, require a continuous data down stream and acknowledgments
upstream and vice versa. Further details on the Realistic WL can be found in our technical
report [19].
3.3.2 Failure Data Logging and Collection
Failures might manifest during the normal WL execution. When a failure occurs, the work-
load is instrumented to register a failure report. Three levels of failure data are produced,
as in the following.
User Level Failures: failure reports about the failure as it manifests to a real user, using a
PANU device. The report also contains details about the BT node status during the failure
(e.g. the WL type, the packet type, the number of sent/received packets);
System Level Failures: failure data registered by system software on the OS system log le,
including BT APIs and OS drivers.
Chapter 3. FFDA of Bluetooth Personal Area Networks 88
RF
Baseband
Audio
LMP
L2CAP
BNEP
SDP IP
C
o
n
tr
o
l 
(H
C
I)
Applications
    	 

       	 

  
  


Figure 3.4: Bluetooth multi-level failure data collection
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Figure 3.5: Reletionship between User Level, System Level, and Channel Level Failures
Channel Level Failures: failure data gathered by a Bluetooth air snier directly over the
wireless media.
It is worth to note how this multi-level approach permits to gather failure data at all
the Bluetooth layers, as evidenced in gure 3.4. As highlighted in gure 3.5, System Level
Failures can be seen as errors for User Level Failures. In other terms, when a User Level
Failure manifests, one or more System Level Failures are registered in the same period
of time. This helps to understand causes behind the high level manifestation. The same
consideration applies for Channel Level Data and both User Level Failures and System
Level Failures. In particular, User Level and System Level Failures may also be due to
problems at the channel level, such as electromagnetic interference and multipath fading
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Figure 3.6: Bluetooth Failure Data Collection Architecture
which may cause some corrupted packets to elude the Baseband's error control schemes
and to propagate to upper layers. The eects of propagation are discussed in section 3.4.3,
whereas the level of self-robustness of the Baseband level with respect to Channel Level
Failures is discussed in section 3.4.2.
The collection architecture we adopted is summarized in gure 3.6. User and System
Level Failure data on PANUs and the NAP is collected by a LogAnalyzer daemon, which
sends it to a central repository, the Log Server, where data are then analyzed by means of
a statistical analysis software. We used the SAS analyzer suite4.
On each PANU, both User Level and System Level failure data is stored in two les:
the Test Log le, which contains User Level failures reports, and the System Log le,
containing all the error information registered by the applications and system daemons
running on the BT host machine (on the NAP, only System Level failures are gathered).
The LogAnalyzer periodically extracts failure data from both the logs, and sends them to
the Log Server.
4SAS is an integrated software platform for business intelligence which includes several tools for statistical
analysis; it is produced by SAS Institute Inc., http://www.sas.com
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As for Channel Level Failures data, we use a commercial Bluetooth air snier tool
in charge of capturing BT trac and of organizing data in dierent structured decoding
formats, from frame level to bit level. The snier is able to collect all the information
we need, such as, failure reports at both the Baseband layer, and the L2CAP, storing
data into a Sniff Log le. To let sning operation not interfere with node activities, the
snier has been installed on a machine that does not join the piconet (the Snier node in
gures 3.6 and 3.2). Due to their passive nature, all current air sniers cannot request the
retransmission of a missed packet. For this reason, data has been snied by installing two
redundant Bluetooth antennas (also called probes, and provided with snier kit). Probes
placement plays a key role to obtain good data. Let us indicate with r the ratio between the
number of frames retransmitted by the nodes and the frames the snier marks as erroneous.
The probes have been placed so as to achieve r = 1. This simple heuristic metric assures
that the snied data is not inuenced by probes location.
Both testbeds have run for more than one year, from June 2004 to November 2005, with
356551 failure data items being collected. In particular, there were 20854 User Level failure
reports from Test Logs and 335697 System level failure entries from System Logs. The
most of the failures (84%) comes from the random workload. Data from the snier have
been captured during a period of 2 months over a testbed running the random WL, with
over 26.5 millions of failure entries from the Sniff Log.
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Figure 3.7: The \merge and coalesce" scheme adopted to pinpoint error-failure relationships
3.3.3 Data Filtering and Manipulation
The System Log contains data from all applications and daemons running on the host
machine; it is thus needed to lter the log in order to capture only BT related information.
This helps to reduce the amount of data which have to be stored and simplies the analysis
process.
We also need to manipulate the data in order to i) gain more insights into error-failure
relationship on each machine, by relating User Level with System Level and Channel Level
failures (via temporal coalescence), and ii) evaluate if and how often the failures manifest
together on dierent machines, by analyzing the User Level Failures correlation among
machines (via spatial coalescence).
The huge amount of data does not allow us to perform these manipulation operations
manually. Hence, we dene a \merge and coalesce" semi-automatic scheme. Let us envision
the scheme with reference to the relationship between System Level and User Level failures.
Scheme's steps are summarized in gure 3.7. First, for each node a log le is produced by
merging its Test Log and System Log les, on a time-based criteria (entries are ordered
according to their timestamps). Second, the merged le is analyzed using the tupling
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coalescence scheme [15], i.e., if two or more events are clustered in time, they are grouped
into a tuple, according to a coalescence window. The window size has been determined by
conducting a sensitivity analysis, as shown in the plot in gure 3.7. The number of obtained
tuples (reported as percentage of entries on the vertical axis) is plotted as a function of
the window size. A critical \knee" is highlighted in the plot. Choosing a point on the
curve before the knee causes the number of tuples to drastically increase, thus generating
truncations, i.e., events related to the same error are grouped into more than one tuple. On
the other hand, choosing a point after the knee generates collapses because events related
to dierent errors are grouped into the same tuple, due to a decreasing number of tuples.
For these reasons, a window size equals to 330 seconds, that is, exactly at the beginning
of the knee, is chosen. Third, the error-failure relationship is inferred by analyzing tuples'
contents. For instance, if a tuple contains both a \Connect Failed" user level message, and
HCI system level messages, an evidence of a HCI-connect relationship is found. Counting
all the HCI-connect evidences gives a mean to weight the relationship.
This scheme can easily be adopted in the other cases of our interest. For example, to
infer the Channel Level - User Level relationship, the scheme is adopted with reference to
the Test Log and the Sniff Log. In the case of the correlation among User Level failures
from dierent machines, the scheme is adopted by using the Test Logs from all the ma-
chines.
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3.4 Key Findings
3.4.1 Bluetooth PAN Failure Model.
Failures are classied by analyzing their spontaneous manifestation, as recorded in Test,
System, and Sniff Logs. The failure model described here is general, in the sense that it
considers all failure reports and events gathered from both testbeds and all the machines.
Failure manifestations are workload independent, i.e., the same failure types have been
observed, regardless of the workload being run. Dierences are in the failure rates, as will
be detailed in section 3.4.4.
Figure 3.8 gives an overall picture of the Bluetooth PAN failure model. This considers
three levels of failures: user, system, and channel level, according to the collection method-
ology previously described. The reported failure types are the result of an accurate clas-
sication of the collected failures' reports. Messages related to the same failure have been
classied into one failure type. This gives the model simplicity and understandability. The
table at the top in gure 3.8 describes user level failures, the table at the center is dedicated
to system level failures, and the table at the bottom reports channel level failures. User level
failures can be grouped into three classes, in accordance with the utilization phase where
they manifest, i.e., searching for devices and services, connecting, and transferring data.
Each group contains one or more failure types. For each failure type, a brief description of
its phenomenology is given in the table. Failures during the connection (Connect group)
can occur during all the steps that are needed to create a PAN channel, such as the L2CAP
and PAN connections setup, the role switch from master to slave, and the binding of the IP
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Figure 3.8: The Bluetooth PAN Failure Model
socket over the BNEP interface. Unexpectedly, failures during data transfer (Data Transfer
group) encompass \Packet Loss" and \Data Mismatch" failures, despite Baseband's error
control mechanisms, such as CRCs, FEC, and HEC schemes. However, as discussed in [84],
the weakness of integrity checks is the assumption of having memoryless channels with
uncorrelated errors from bit to bit. In our case, correlated errors (e.g. bursts) can occur
due to the nature of the wireless media, aected by multi-path fading and electromagnetic
interferences. The failure of the integrity checks is further investigated in next subsections.
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System level failures are grouped with respect to their location, i.e., BT software stack
and OS/Drivers. Failure types have been dened according to the component which sig-
naled the failure. For each failure type, a brief description is given. For instance, the
L2CAP module logs the presence of unexpected received frames, that is a start frame when
a continuation frame is expected, and vice-versa. This is probably due to interferences,
causing either frames or the synchronization with the piconet's clock, to be lost.
Finally, channel level failures are classied into two classes, header related and payload
related, according to the portion of the packet that results to be corrupted. The \Hard Pay-
load Corruption" deserves more attention, since it is the only one that propagates to upper
layers. The other failures are indeed successfully detected and masked by the Baseband's
FEC, HEC and CRC detection and retransmission schemes, as shown in the next subsection.
3.4.2 Baseband Coverage
Failure data from the air snier evidenced a very high failure rate at the Baseband layer.
The average failure rate resulted to be 6.822 failures per second. If we consider that 596
frames on average are transmitted every second, this means that about one frame out of
100 frames is delivered with errors. This faulty behavior of the wireless media is well bal-
anced by Baseband's error check and retransmission mechanisms. All \Header Corruptions"
(which represent the 88.42 % of channel failures), \Length Mismatches" (1.806%), and \Soft
Payload Corruptions" (9.77%) are indeed detected and successfully masked. The remaining
0.004% of the failures, i.e., \Hard Payload Corruptions", are not detected by baseband and
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hence they propagate to upper layers (the consequences of this propagation are investigated
in next subsection). This leads to an overall coverage of the Baseband layer of 0.99996.
The causes of the propagation can be found in the bursty nature of the corruptions. As
known, the CRC-CCITT polynomial used by Baseband's CRC cannot always detect error
bursts, and, in fact, it detects 18 bits or longer bursts with 0.99998 coverage probability.
We analyzed the corrupted packets, discovering that error bursts have an average size of
512 bits.
The time between propagations, that is, the time between \Hard Payload Corruptions",
follows an exponential probability distribution, whit a shape parameter  = 2:73  10 4 s 1,
and mean equals to 3665 seconds. In other terms, about one propagation per hour oc-
curs, and consecutive propagations are uncorrelated with each other. The tting has been
conducted using the SAS analyzer. We tried to t the data with exponential, lognormal,
and weibull distributions, using the Maximum Likelihood Estimators provided by SAS.
The goodness of t is proved by means of three well-known tests: Kolmogorov-Smirnov,
Cameron-Von Mises, and Anderson-Darling. The tests conrmed the exponential tting.
3.4.3 Propagation Phenomena
This section reports the results of a propagation analysis between User Level, System Level,
and Channel Level failures, in order to discover the low level causes behind high level failure
manifestations. First, we investigate the User Level - System Level failures relationship,
then we complete the analysis with the Channel level causes.
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Table 3.2 illustrates the results obtained by applying the merge and coalesce approach
to the Test and System Log les, with a coalescence window equals to 330 seconds. The
interpretation of the table is simple: the greater is the percentage reported in a cell, the
stronger is the relationship between the user level failure (on the row) and the system
level failure (on the column). Percentages on each row sum to 100 (except from the \tot"
column), so as to have a clear indication of user level failure causes. The \total" row and
the \tot" column report the total percentages, e.g., the 49.9% of the user failures are due to
HCI system failures. In order to discover error propagation phenomena from the NAP to
PANUs, the user level data have also been related with the NAP's system log le (i.e., the
server), with the same merge and coalesce approach. Hence, for each system level failure
column, the table reports the gures obtained by relating the Test log with both the local
System Log and the NAP's System Log, for each machine. The table contains very useful
information about the error-failure relationship, and NAP-PANU propagation phenomena.
For example, failures during the L2CAP connection (row \Connect failed" in the table) are
mostly due to timeout problems in the HCI module, either from the local machine or from
the NAP. This occurs when a connection request (or accept) is issued on a busy device. PAN
connection failures are instead frequently related to failures reported by the SDP daemon
(the 96.5% of the cases). Interestingly, we observed that exactly the 96.5% of PAN connect
failures manifests when the SDP Search is not performed by the workload (in other terms,
when the SDP ag is false). This is a clear indication that avoiding caching and performing
the SDP search before a PAN connection is a good practice to reduce PAN connect failures
occurrence. In the remaining cases in which the SDP search is performed (the 3.5% of the
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Table 3.2: Error-Failure Relationship: System Failures are regarded as errors for User Failures
User Level Failures
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32.10.917.215.40.921.82.7Packet loss
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1
USB
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3.5
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35.5
HOTPLUG
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2050.920SDP search failed
5.285.1Connect failed
96.5PAN connect failed
55.5Bind failed
49.78.210.90.9Sw role command failed
Inquiry/scan failed
BCSPSDPHCIL2CAP
System Level Failures
cases), the PAN connection fails due to errors in the BNEP module (see table 3.2). In
particular it fails to add the requested connection on the L2CAP connection. One more
interesting relationship is between \Switch role request failed" and command transmission
timeouts signaled by the HCI module (the 91.1% of switch role request failures). This
suggests that increasing the timeout in the API helps to reduce the switcth role request
failure occurrence. For some failures, such as \Inquiry/Scan failed" and \Data Mismatch",
no relationships have been found. Table 3.2 also permits to dene masking strategies, as
detailed in section 3.5.1.
The same methodology has been applied to discover the relationship between Channel Level
and User/System level failures. In this case, a coalescence window equals to 280 seconds had
been chosen. Figure 3.9 summarizes the results5, emphasizing the propagation phenomena
from \Hard Payload Corruptions" to User Level and System level failures. Data are gathered
5Figure 3.9 only reports the propagation of \Hard Payload Corruptions" to upper layers, and, for a
matter of space, it does not evidence all the System level causes of User Level Failures, such as \Packet
Loss" failures due to HCI errors, since they are already summarized in table 3.2.
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Figure 3.9: Propagation diagram of Hard Payload Corruptions to User and System Level Failures
on a single node
from a two months experiment with the random WL on every node. In the gure, the ellipses
represent failures (at the various levels) and the arrows represent propagations. The number
on each arrow is the average propagation probability; for instance, when a \Hard Payload
Corruption" occurs, it generates a \Data Mismatch" failure with a 0.189 probability. The
probabilities for the arrows from System to User Level failures are inferred from Table 3.2,
whereas the remaining have been obtained by merging and coalescing the Sniff Log with
the Test and System Log les, for each node. Note that the diagram only takes into account
local propagations, i.e., propagations on the same node.
The diagram shows several interesting points. \Hard Payload Corruptions" directly
cause \Data Mismatches" (18.9% of the cases), L2CAP errors (21.1%), BNEP errors (43%),
and \Packet Losses" (17%). This is easily justiable if we look at the structure of the packets
that are transmitted among nodes, when the random WL is adopted6. As gure 3.10 points
out, a burst corruption may aect the L2CAP header, the BNEP header, the IP and UDP
6We recall that the snier has been used in conjuction with the random WL
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Figure 3.10: Hard Payload Corruptions consequences with respect to the packet's structure; one of
the indicated errors/failures manifest, depending on the position of the corruption within the packet
headers, or, nally, the data itself. Hence, one of the above mentioned failures manifests
depending on the position of the burst in the packet.
More specically, if the burst aects L2CAP or BNEP headers, L2CAP or BNEP error
manifests. We recall that L2CAP and BNEP are not covered by any error check mechanism,
because they assume the Baseband level to be highly reliable. However, we observed that
Baseband propagates about one failure per hour, causing L2CAP or BNEP to fail in the
64.1% of the cases. Furthermore, as we will discuss later in section 3.5.2, these failures
may also be higly severe, since they can sometimes require a reboot of the machine in
order to reestabish proper operation. This cannot be ignored, especially when considering
critical wireless systems which have to operate continuosly. The possibility of protecting
L2CAP and BNEP headers should thus be considered in the next releases of the Bluetooth
specications.
Once the IP header gets corrupted, the IP module detects the error (the IP header is
protected with a CRC) and discards the packet, causing a \Packet Loss" to be manifested
at the application. Actually, we had no evidences of these phenomena in the system logs,
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since the IP module does not log any information when packets are discarded. However, we
found that the 17% of \Hard Payload Corruptions" directly cause \Packet Losses", thus we
hypothesize that these losses are due to the corruption of the IP header. This is depicted
with a dashed arrow in gure 3.9. Finally, if the corruption aects the UDP header or the
payload, a Data Mismatch failure manifests7. One could question this last statement by
observing that UDP has its own checksum which is computed on the payload also. However,
this ckecksum is usually ignored by real UDP implementations.
Surprisingly, Baseband's payload corruptions can also cause the failure of either switch
role or PAN Connection operation, other than packet losses or data mismatches. This is
because switch role or PAN Connection operations are performed by sending commands
over the air between two end-points. If one of this commands is delivered with errors, the
whole operation fails. To be clearer, let us envision an exemplary situation. Verde wants
to establish a PAN connection with Giallo, hence it sends BNEP commands to Giallo.
Unfortunately Giallo's answers are delivered with errors, so the Verde's BNEP module
ignores them. When a timeout expires, BNEP registers a \Failed to add a connection"
message on the System log, and consecutively the application (the Bluetest) records on the
Test log that the PAN connection operation has failed. This explains the \Hard Payload
Corruption - BNEP - PAN Connect Failed" chain.
As a last result, we evaluate the spatial correlation of failures among nodes. The analysis
has been conducted with the merge and coalesce approach applied to the Test Logs of all
the slave nodes, i.e., six nodes, for both workloads, with a coalescence window of 120 seconds.
7Note that some UDP header corruptions may cause packet losses in the case that the corruption aects
the server port
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Figure 3.11: Example of clusters of failures.
To simplify the analysis, we only consider failures that cannot be masked. In other terms,
we do not consider \Bind Failed", \Switch Role Command Failed", and \NAP not found",
for which we dened proper masking strategies that prevent these failures from occurring
(see section 3.5.1). As a macroscopic gure, the 10.82% of the total number of failures
resulted to manifest as a cluster.
By cluster of failures we mean two or more User Level Failures that manifest within the
coalescence window onto two or more distinct nodes. Figure 3.11 exemplies the concept of
cluster of failures. The gure shows two clusters. The one on the left is a 3-nodes cluster on
Ipaq, Azzurro, and Verde. The one on the right is a 3-nodes cluster as well because, even
if it contains four instances of failures, two of them come from the same node (i.e., Verde).
A summary of the results is given in table 3.3. Columns represent the clusters of fail-
ures we observed, the rows are the number of nodes, and the gures are the percentage of
failures with respect to the total number of clustered failures. For example, the 51.01% of
the clusters are composed by two \Packet Loss" instances (on two distinct nodes). From
the table, it is clear that \Packet Loss" failures are likely to manifest together on more than
one node. Moreover, the 38.98% of the total number of \Packet Loss" failures manifests as
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Table 3.3: Spatial coalescence of failures among nodes
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clusters. This indicates that \Packet Losses" are often due to causes aecting whole parts
of the piconet, such as wide-band interference phenomena or temporary unavailabilities of
the master node.
3.4.4 Further Results
Figure 3.12 reports the results of the tting for the time to failure (TTF) of two User
Level failures. Failure data comes from two nodes, \Bind Failed" failures on Azzurro, and
\Connect Failed" failures on Verde (data are from the random WL). We tried to t the
data with exponential, lognormal, and weibull distribution, using the SAS analyzer. Both
the probability plots, and the results from the goodness of t tests in table 3.4, indicate
that these failures follow the lognormal distribution. The probability plots show that real
data lies on the line of lognormal percentiles, at least until the 99 and 95 percentile for the
\Bind Failed" case and the \Connect Failed" case, respectively. Data points which does not
follow the line indicates that real data presents a shorter tail as compared to the lognormal
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Figure 3.12: Examples of TTF ttings. (a) Histogram and ttings for \Bind Failed" failures on
Azzurro, (b) probability plot of Azzurro's \Bind Failed" TTF values for the Lognormal distribution,
(c) Histogram and ttings for \Connect Failed" failures on Verde, (d) probability plot of Verde's
\Connect Failed" TTF values for the Lognormal distribution.
one. As for the goodness of t tests (table 3.4), the p-values obtained for the lognormal
tting are the best ones, for both cases.
The same analysis has been conducted for each User Level Failure on each node, and
the results are summarized in table 3.5. Failure data are gathered from the Random WL.
Giallo is not present, since the NAP only records system level data. Each cell in the table
contains the tted distribution and its parameters, the MTTF evaluated in seconds, and
the coecient of variation, evaluated as the standard deviation divided by the MTTF. In
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Table 3.4: Goodness of Fit Tests for Bind Failed on Azzurro and Connect Failed on Verde
Results for Bind Failed failures on Azzurro
Weibull fittingExponential fittingLognormal fitting
0.136
> 0.25
0.156
p-value
A2 = 1.699
W2 = 0.191
D = 0.014
Result
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
p-value
A2 = 157.5
W2 = 22.76
D = 0.116
Result p-valueResultTest
< 0.001A2 = 76.84Anderson-Darling
< 0.001W2 = 11.23Cramer-von Mises
< 0.001D = 0.075Kolmogorov-Smirnov
Results for Connect Failed failures on Verde
Weibull fittingExponential fittingLognormal fitting
> 0.25
> 0.25
> 0.25
p-value
A2 = 0.921
W2 = 0.077
D = 0.032
Result
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
p-value
A2 = 39.31
W2 = 6.941
D = 0.192
Result p-valueResultTest
0.007A2 = 4.301Anderson-Darling
0.016W2 = 0.682Cramer-von Mises
0.007D = 0.076Kolmogorov-Smirnov
particular, Logn(; ) indicates a lognormal distribution, with shape parameter  and scale
parameter , whereas Exp() indicates an exponential distribution with shape parameter
. A minus symbol in a cell x,y means that no data are available for failure x on node
y, whereas the acronym n.e.d. stands for not enough data, meaning that the number of
available data items were not enough to conduct a signicant tting. The coecient of
variation resulted to be low for most of the failures, conrming a good consistency of the
data.
As can be noticed from the table, almost all the failures on each node are distributed
as lognormal. The lognormal distribution is used extensively in reliability applications to
model failure times. A random variable can be modeled as log-normal if it can be thought
of as the multiplicative product of many small independent factors. In our case, this means
that User Level Failures are the product of many small faults at a lower level. These faults
can be both software faults, e.g., heisenbugs (i.e., design faults which conditions of activation
occur rarely or are not easily reproducible [107]) at the various level of the Bluetooth stack,
and channel faults, as the \Hard Payload Corruption" case. As for software faults, this is
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Table 3.5: Fitting summary of every User Level Failure on each node. Each cell contains the tted
distribution, the MTTF, and the coecient of variation. Data comes from the Random WL
Logn (0.84,10.06)
44506 ; 1.25
--
Logn (0.83,5.73)
436 ; 0.96
--Bind Failed
Exp(51578)
51578 ; 1.09
Exp(46892)
46891 ; 1.01
Exp(48726)
48726 ; 0.96
Exp(47526)
47526 ; 0.98
Exp(50384)
50384 ; 1.12
Exp(46978)
46978 ; 1.03
Data 
Mismatch
Logn (1.81,9.63)
30976 ; 0.74
Logn (1.83,7.74)
7784 ; 1.55
Logn (1.89,8.01)
9973 ; 1.47
Logn (1.66,6.97)
3386 ; 2.00
Logn (1.60,7.40)
5256 ; 2.11
Logn (1.80,8.33)
11682 ; 1.25
Packet loss
-
Logn(1.11,9.89)
29660 ; 0.67
Logn(1.13,10.15)
50839 ; 0.90
Logn(1.13,10.12)
48201 ; 0.93
Logn (1.10,10.02)
41931 ; 1.12
n.e.d.
Switch Role
Req. Failed
-
Logn (1.72,8.41)
12234 ; 1.27
Logn (1.32,7.00)
2695 ; 2.17
Logn (1.39,9.50)
25134 ; 0.84
Logn (1.37,9.40)
22648 ; 0.88
Logn (1.34,10.07)
45218 ; 1.19
Switch Role
Com. Failed
-
Logn (1.51,10.23)
53789 ; 1.21
Logn (1.45,10.32)
54812 ; 1.16
Logn (1.62,10.30)
54561 ; 0.93
Logn (1.39,10.28)
54248 ; 1.05 
Logn (1.48,10.33)
54851 ; 0.79
Pan Connect
Failed
-
Logn (1.12,10.05)
36876 ; 0.85
Logn (1.86,9.69)
36862 ; 1.18
Logn (1.39,10.02)
42408 ; 0.86
Logn (1.36,9.36)
21899 ; 1.19
Logn (1.52,8.25)
10035 ; 1.42
Connect
Failed
n.e.d.-n.e.d.n.e.d.-n.e.d.
SDP Search 
Failed
Logn(1.23,10.93)
56148 ; 0.82
Logn(1.16,10.62)
54615 ; 0.75
Logn(1.19,11.03)
60085 ; 0.92
Logn(1.19,10.61)
54348 ; 1.10
Logn (1.39,10.73)
54812 ; 0.83
Logn(1.11,10.98)
58154 ; 0.70
Nap Not
Found
--n.e.d.--n.e.d.
Inquiry/Scan
Failed
WinZaurus (2.4)Ipaq (2.4)Azzurro (2.6)Miseno (2.6)Verde (2.4)
coherent with recent results arguing that they can be successfully modeled as lognormal [78].
From table 3.5 it can be noticed that the failures follows the same distribution regard-
less of the particular node's characteristics. For example, Packet Losses are lognormal on
every node. This conrms that the underlying nature of the failure is the same. What
changes are the parameters of the distributions, since failure dynamics depend on the dif-
ferent software and hardware architectures. For example \Switch Role Command Failed"
failures are more frequent on PDAs (Ipaq and Zaurus), due to the complexity introduced
by the BCSP. \Bind Failed" failures only appeared on Azzurro and Win. On Azzurro, that
runs a Fedora Core distribution, the problem remained even after upgrading the hardware
to a Pentium 4 1.8 GHz with 512 Gb RAM. The problem is hence probably due to the new
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Figure 3.13: Workload inuence on failures' manifestation
version of the Hardware Abstraction Layer (HAL), rstly deployed on fedora core distribu-
tions, and responsible for the network interfaces hotplug mechanism. As will be discussed
in section 3.5.1, \Bind Failed" are indeed mostly due to the hotplug mechanism, which
appeared to be extremely slow on Fedora Core and Windows.
Besides these examples, no signicant dierences have been observed with respect to
dierent versions of the Linux Kernel (2.4 and 2.6). On the other hand, it is evident the
dierence between Linux machines and the Windows one. In general, the Windows node,
running the Broadcomm stack, exhibits better reliability, in that failures are rarer if com-
pared with Linux nodes (Win's MTTF values are in general higher than other nodes MTTF
values). Moreover, some failures do not occur at all on Windows nodes, such as \Connect
Failed", \PAN Connect Failed", \Switch Role Request Failed", and \Switch Role Command
Failed". This can be explained by looking at the implementation of the correspondent API,
which are asynchronous and robust with respect to problems during the request.
Interestingly, only \Data Mismatch" failures are distributed as exponential. This is
coherent with the fact that the only cause for \Data Mismatches" are \Hard Payload Cor-
ruptions", which also resulted to be exponentially distributed.
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Let us now investigate how these results change if we consider the failure data obtained
with the realistic WL. The histogram in gure 3.13 gives a quick idea of the dierences8,
that is, the realistic WL causes in general less failures than the random one. This result
is coherent with the major dierence between the two WLs, i.e., the random WL is char-
acterized by short data transfer sessions (about 1.5 mins on average); the realistic WL has
instead longer data transfer sessions (about 5 mins of average). Hence, the random WL
spends most of the time creating and destroying connections, whereas the realistic WL
stresses more the established connections. The result is that the random WL causes more
failures, since it continuously stimulates the piconet with new connections. Another evi-
dence is that, in the case of realistic WL, most of the failures are \Packet Losses" (which
occur during data transfer), whereas the most frequent is the \Bind Failed" in the case of
random WL (which occurs during the connection setup).
Even if the realistic WL causes less failures, the nature of them is the same as the ones
caused by the random WL. An evidence of this statement is provided by table 3.6, where
the results of the tting are proposed for failure data obtained with the realistic WL. The
table shows that the distributions are the same, although we observe a slight change in
their parameters. In particular, the \NAP not Found" failure seems to be more frequent
in the case of realistic WL. This can be explained considering that when the realistic WL
is used, the NAP is often overloaded with data transfers, hence causing the SDP server to
fail to answer requests for the NAP service on time. Other failures, such as \Bind Failed"
and \Packet Loss", manifest slightly less often than in the case of random WL. This can be
8For better readability, we reported only the most frequent failures in the histogram
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Table 3.6: Fitting summary for every User Level Failure on each node. Each cell contains the tted
distribution, the MTTF, and the coecient of variation. Data comes from the Realistic WL
Logn(1.65,11.67)
61451 ; 1.52
--
Logn(1.69,7.65)
7016 ; 1.85
--Bind Failed
Exp(50984)
50984 ; 1.05
Exp(48104)
48104 ; 0.96
Exp(50025)
50025 ; 1.01
Exp(49486)
49486 ; 0.92
Exp(50548)
50547 ; 1.03
Exp(48875)
48875; 1.05
Data 
Mismatch
Logn(2.19,10.32)
50146 ; 0.83
Logn(2.31,9.01)
17851 ; 1.56
Logn(2.18,8.98)
17048 ; 0.98
Logn(2.34,7.75)
11883 ; 1.38
Logn(2.21,8.23)
15273 ; 1.26
Logn(2.23,8.55)
16401 ; 2.15
Packet loss
-n.e.d.n.e.d.n.e.d.n.e.d.n.e.d.
Switch Role
Req. Failed
-
Logn(1.69,9.01)
18174 ; 1.52
Logn(1.64,7.29)
4659 ; 2.01
Logn(1.51,9.56)
31910 ; 0.89
Logn(1.38,9.31)
21154 ; 0.94
Logn(1.41,10.16)
48202 ; 1.95
Switch Role
Com. Failed
-n.e.dn.e.dn.e.dn.e.dn.e.d
Pan Connect
Failed
-
Logn(1.14,10.45)
50509 ; 1.53
Logn(1.85,9.65)
31450 ; 1.04
Logn(1.32,9.92)
41174 ; 0.92
Logn(1.42,9.29)
20457 ; 0.84
Logn(1.26,9.29)
19165 ; 0.91
Connect
Failed
n.e.d..-n.e.d..n.e.d.-n.e.d.
SDP Search 
Failed
Logn(1.21,10.12)
47681 ; 0.92
Logn(1.19,10.03)
45176 ; 1.59
Logn(1.15,10.52)
54846 ; 1.18
Logn(1.24,10.39)
52608 ; 0.89 
Logn(1.21,10.43)
53178 ; 1.81
Logn (1.17,10.57)
53915 ; 1.12
Nap Not
Found
--n.e.d..--n.e.d.
Inquiry/Scan
Failed
WinZaurus (2.4)Ipaq (2.4)Azzurro (2.6)Miseno (2.6)Verde (2.4)
due to the less stressful nature of the realistic WL.
Figure 3.14a shows the \Packet loss" distribution as a function of the networked ap-
plication that was run by the Realistic WL during the failure. Results pinpoint Peer to
Peer (P2P) and Streaming applications as the most critical for BT PANs. They are indeed
characterized by long sessions with continuous data transfer, which overload the channel
and stress its time-based synchronization mechanism. At a rst glance, this may surprise,
since P2P protocols are TCP-based. However, the most of the packet losses are due to
broken BT links, which cause the TCP end-to-end channel to brake as well. Streaming
causes less failures than P2P due to its isochronous nature, which better ts the BT time-
based nature. Less failures are experienced with Web, Mail, and File Transfer Protocol
(FTP) applications, which are characterized by intermittent transfers. This indicates that
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Percentage of Packet loss failures
Networked Application Distance (m)
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Figure 3.14: a) \Packet loss" failure distribution as a function of the networked application used
by the Realistic WL. b) Failures distribution as a function of the distance from PANUs to the NAP
Bluetooth ACL channels are less failure prone when used in an intermittent manner.
Finally, it is interesting to notice that the failure distribution is not signicantly inu-
enced by the distance between the BT antennas. From data relative to the Realistic WL
we measured that the 33.33%, 37.14%, and 29.63% of failures occur with a distance 0.5 m,
5 m, and 7 m, respectively, as summarized in gure 3.14b. Bind failures are not taken into
account in the count. They would have biased the measure, since they only manifest on
two hosts.
3.5 Masking Strategies and SIRAs
3.5.1 Error Masking Strategies
A deeper investigation on obtained results led us to the denition of three error masking
strategies. These strategies have been dened for the following user level failures.
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 Bind failed : it is mostly related to problems in the host OS hotplug interface or to
errors when invoking HCI commands (see table 3.2). Our investigation on source code
on BT Kernel modules has led to the following considerations. The creation process
of an IP network interface over BT requires: i) a time interval (TC) for the creation of
the L2CAP connection; and ii) a time interval (TH) needed by the BT stack to build
the BNEP virtual network interface over L2CAP, and by the OS hotplug interface to
congure the interface. The problem is that the Pan Connect API is not synchronous
with TC and TH , even in the Broadcomm case, hence, a \Bind Failed" failure occurs
whenever the application attempts to bind a socket on the supposed existing BNEP
interface before TC and TH . In particular, if the bind request is issued before TC , a
HCI command failure (i.e., command for invalid handle) occurs, because the L2CAP
connection is not present. If the request is instead issued after TC but before TH ,
a failure occurs, either because the interface is not present or it does not have been
congured yet by the hotplug mechanism. To prevent the failure from occurring,
it is sucient to wait for TC and TH to elapse. TC elapses as soon as the L2CAP
connection has a valid handle. This check can be easily added in the PAN connection
API. As for TH , the OS hotplug interface can be instrumented so as to notify the
application as soon as the BNEP interface is up and congured.
 Switch role command failed and NAP not found : the switch role failure is often re-
lated to out of order packets failures signaled by the BCSP module (49.7% of the
cases, see table 3.2). Also, it especially manifests on PDAs (as seen in section 3.4.4),
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since they adopt BSCP. The failure can also be related to many other causes, such
as unexpected L2CAP frames (0.9% local, 4.4% on the NAP), HCI command for in-
valid handle (10.9% local, 2.4% on the NAP), and busy BNEP device(18.8% local).
This multitude of transient causes does not isolate the symptoms of the failure, and
it does not allow to dene precise maskings. Therefore we tried to simply repeat the
command when it fails. We experienced that repeating the action up to 2 times (with
1 second wait between a retry and the successive) is enough to let the underneath
transient cause disappear, and hence to make the command success. The same con-
siderations apply to the case of NAP not found. We experienced that repeating the
operation up to 1 time (with 1 second wait) is enough to make the operation success.
3.5.2 SW Implemented Recovery Actions
As soon as a failure is detected9, several Software Implemented Recovery Actions (SIRAs)
are attempted in cascade. This approach allows to pinpoint, for each failure, the most
eective recovery action, that is, the one that xes the problem with a high probability.
Note that this is the only viable approach, since we do not have any a priori knowledge
about the best recovery to perform each time. Upon failure detection, the following recovery
actions are triggered subsequently, i.e., when the i-th action does not succeed, the (i+1)-th
action is performed.
1. IP socket reset : the socket is destroyed and then rebuilt; this action is applied only
9Failure detection is performed by simply checking the return state of each BT or IP API that is invoked
by the WL. Examples are the indication that a PAN connection cannot be created, or a timeout when
waiting for an expected packet.
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when the connection (PAN and L2CAP) is already up.
2. BT connection reset : the L2CAP and PAN connections are closed and established
again;
3. BT stack reset : the BT stack variables and data are cleaned up, by restoring the
initial states;
4. Application restart : the BlueTest is automatically closed and restarted;
5. Multiple application restart : up to 3 application restarts are attempted, consecutively;
6. System reboot : the entire system is rebooted;
7. Multiple system reboot : up to 5 system reboots are attempted. Actually, we experi-
enced a maximum of four consecutive reboots to restore normal operation.
The given recovery actions are ordered according to their increasing costs, in terms of
recovery time. The more attempts have to be done for a failure, the more the failure is
severe: if action j was successful, we can say the failure has a severity j. This gives us an
indication for failure severity.
Table 3.7 highlights the relationship between user level failures and recovery actions.
Data is relative to all the machines and come from both testbeds, and it considers only
non-masked failures. Each number in a cell represents the percentage of success of the
recovery action (on the column) with respect to the given user level failure (on the row).
Therefore, the numbers give an indication of the eectiveness of each SIRA for each failure
(which is an estimation of the probability that a certain recovery action goes through).
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Table 3.7: User failures-SIRAs relationship
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The column \Tot" reports the total percentage with respect to unmasked failures, e.g., the
13.6% of unmasked failures are \Connect Failed". Similarly to table 3.2, numbers on each
row sum to 100, in order to have a simple indication of which are the eective SIRAs for
each user failure. For example, a \Switch Role Request Failed" is most probably recovered
by resetting the BT stack (in the 48.2% of the cases). Hence, this should be the rst action
to be attempted when the failure is detected. The table also allows to calculate failure
severity. For instance, the \Connect failure" is one of the most severe, since it is often
recovered by expensive SIRAs (the 84.6% of the cases from \Application restart" up to
\Multiple system reboot").
Failure-recovery relationship provides further understandings of failure causes and na-
ture. As an example, packet losses recovered by an IP socket reset (the 5.9% of packet
losses) are due to \Hard Payload Corruptions" detected by the IP CRC. It is indeed not
necessary to reestablish the L2CAP and BNEP connections. The rest of the packet losses
are instead likely due to a broken link, since they at least require the connection to be
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reestabilished. These broken link failures can be caused by \Hard Payload Corruptions"
aecting the L2CAP or BNEP headers, then causing the corruption of the data structures
that maintain the link state. Hence, depending on the severity of the corruption, several
dierent recovery actions are needed, from the BT Connection reset to the reboot of the ma-
chine. For \Data Mismatch" failures, no recoveries are dened. \Data Mismatch" failures
are not realistically recoverable, since a real application only relies on integrity mechanisms
furnished by the communication protocols, and cannot know the actual instance of data
being transferred.
Multiple Application Restart and BT Stack Reset recoveries are the most frequent. This
indicates that the most of the failures are due to corrupted values of the state of the stack
or to the corrupted execution state of the application.
It is worth noting that some failures can be recovered only after multiple application
restarts or even after multiple reboots. Those failures are probably caused by problems in
the NAP. This is conrmed in table 3.2, which highlights such relationship between user
failures and NAP's system failures.
In Table 3.8 we summarize the statistical distributions of the time to recover (TTR) for
each recovery action on every node. Data comes from both the workloads. This gives an
overall idea of the time that is needed to recover from failures, with respect to the dierent
architectures we adopted. Similarly to table 3.5, each cell in table 3.8 contains the tted
distribution and its parameters, the MTTR, and the coecient of variation. In this case,
the distributions are translated in time, by means of the location parameter . It is indeed
unlikely to nd TTR values equals to 0. Specically, Logn(; ; ) indicates a lognormal
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Table 3.8: Fitting summary for each Recovery Action on every node. Each cell contains the tted
distribution, the MTTR, and the coecient of variation
n.e.d.n.e.d.n.e.d.n.e.d.n.e.d.n.e.d.
Multiple appli-
cation restart
-n.e.d.n.e.d.n.e.d.n.e.d.n.e.d.
Multiple system 
reboot
Exp (612.5,10.5)
623.00 ; 0.59
Exp (102.29,17.3)
119.59 ; 0.73
Exp (98.67,21.89)
120.56 ; 0.82
Exp (231.71,37.07)
268.86 ; 0.71
Exp (269.99,21.38)
291.36 ; 0.70
Exp (370.64,33)
403.64 ; 0.85
System reboot
n.e.d.
Logn (2.82,0.61,3.52)
43.41 ; 0.58
Logn (-6.49,0.34,3.84)
42.65 ; 0.40
Logn (10.47,0.43,3.38)
43.02 ; 0.38
-
Logn (14.62,0.32,4.31)
93.33 ; 0.27
Application 
restart
Exp (58.92,4.58)
63.50 ; 0.11
Logn (6.47,0.77,2.91)
31.06 ; 0.65
Logn (7.77,0.77,3.12)
38.71 ; 0.74
Logn (10.67,0.81,2.48)
27.12 ; 0.55
Logn (8.75,0.37,1.47)
20.08 ; 0.37
Logn (11.67,0.57,4.27)
82.12 ; 0.72
BT Stack reset
-
Exp(3.97,12.47)
16.44 ; 0.79
Exp(3.99,17.00)
20.99 ; 0.75
Exp(5.97,14.60)
20.57 ; 0.60
Exp(4.89,23.49)
28.40 ; 0.61
Exp(3.81,10.4)
14.21 ; 0.71
BT Connection 
reset
Exp(9.99,0.25)
10.24 ; 0.07
Exp(1.93,2.86)
4.79 ; 0.77
Exp(1.94,1.38)
3.31 ; 0.71
Exp(1.58,5.00)
6.58 ; 0.78
Exp(1.98,2.42)
4.40 ; 0.83
Exp(1.97;2.30)
4.27 ; 1.05 
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Figure 3.15: Probability plot of Miseno's Multiple System Reboot TTR values for the exponential
distribution
distribution, with shape parameter , scale parameter , and location parameter , whereas
Exp(; ) indicates an exponential distribution with shape parameter  and location pa-
rameter . It is worth noting that \Multiple Application Restart" and \Multiple System
Reboot" recovery actions could be probably modeled as hyper-exponential. Indeed, from
the probability plot in gure 3.15, which reports the percentiles of \Multiple System Re-
boot" data from Miseno, it is easy to see that data points are concentrated around 600 s
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(roughly equal to the time needed for two consecutive reboots), 900 s (three reboots) and
1200 s (four reboots). This suggests that the TTR for this recovery action could be model as
a sum of three exponential random variables each of them centered around 600 s, 900 s and
1200 s, respectively. Unfortunately, we do not have enough data to conrm these hypothesis.
3.6 Dependability Improvement of Bluetooth PANs
From collected data, and from results of the previous sections, it is possible to estimate
the dependability improvement which can be obtained by integrating software implemented
recovery actions and error masking strategies into the testbeds. To this aim, we consider two
typical usage scenarios: i) each time that a failure occurs, the user performs the reboot of the
terminal (PC or a PDA); ii) the user performs the following recovery actions, subsequently,
ii.1) he/she tries to restart the application, and ii.2)in the case that the application fails
again, he/she reboots the terminal. For both scenarios we are able to evaluate Mean TTF
and TTR values (MTTF and MTTR), since we can calculate the average recovery time for
reboot and for the application restart from the collected data. In order to obtain upper
bound measures, we assume that the `user thinking time' is zero, i.e. we do not encompass
it in the TTR value. Finally, we compare the two scenarios with the enhanced facilities
that we implemented in the workload, i.e. software implemented recovery actions and error
masking. Results are summarized in table 3.9, for both realistic and random WLs and for all
the nodes of the testbeds. We evaluate the dependability improvement for both workloads
because i) the random one give us indications on the dependability level of BT as used
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Table 3.9: Dependability Improvement of Bluetooth PANs
Random Workload
1.632.251.600.94C.o.V. MTTR
2.613.263.667.50C.o.V. MTTF
59.98000% Masking
73.84**57.7600% Coverage
0.8860.852< 0.736< 0.331Availability*
141.3175.34131.12331.51MTTR (s)
1097.95422.56364.78164.39MTTF (s)
SIRAs and 
masking
With only 
SIRAs
App restart 
and Reboot
Only 
Reboot
Realistic Workload
1.842.241.431.09C.o.V. MTTR
1.621.962.002.06C.o.V. MTTF
52.54000% Masking
75.42***62.1500% Coverage
0.9830.974< 0.942< 0.904Availability*
124.2989.26199.49328.49MTTR (s)
7090.183351.203240.973111.97MTTF (s)
SIRAs and 
masking
With only 
SIRAs
App restart 
and Reboot
Only 
Reboot
* = MTTF/(MTTF+MTTR)   
** = 59.98% (masking) + 13.86% (coverage of the remaining failures)
*** = 52.54% (masking) + 22.88% (coverage of the remaining failures)
in high critical scenarios; and ii) the realistic one give us indications of the dependability
level achieved form the everyday dependability perspective. For each obtained measure, we
also report the coecient of variation as a measure of the variability. The advantage of
using such a coecient is that it is normalized by the mean, and hence it allows comparison
among dierent measures.
As for the coverage, we refer to failure mode coverage as dened in [1](failure assumptions
coverage). As we have already observed, the random WL causes more failures hence it
exhibits a lower availability and reliability than the realistic WL. In both cases, SIRAs give
a good coverage, and specically the 57.76% for the random WL, and the 62.15% for the
realistic WL. In other terms, SIRAs recover more than half of the failures, without rebooting
or restarting the application (as a typical user would have done). In the fourth column of
both tables we reported results taking also into account the error masking strategies, which
gives a coverage of 73.84% and 75.42% for the random and realistic WL, respectively. This,
in our opinion, represents a good result for the eectiveness of fault tolerance techniques
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we have assessed from the analysis of gathered data. As far as the availability is concerned,
results show that the software implemented recovery actions and the error masking strategies
actually improved the availability of BT PANs. The eectiveness is evident in the case of
the random WL: starting from 0.331 (scenario 1) and 0.736 (scenario 2), which are the upper
bound measured values of BT PAN availability, to 0.852 and 0.886, with an improvement of
20.38% (relative to scenario 2), up to 167.67% (relative to scenario 1). The error masking
strategies inuence the MTTF estimation, which varied from 164 s to 1098 s. This results in
an actual reliability improvement of 569%. Similar considerations apply to the realistic WL,
even if in this case the margins of improvement are lower. The availability improvement
is of 4.35% (relative to scenario 2), up to 8.74% (relative to scenario 1). The MTTF
estimation varied from 3112 s to 7090 s, with a reliabilty improvment of 128%. It should
be noted that, even using SIRAs and masking, the MTTF values are low, i.e., each 18
minutes on average a node in the piconet fails, in the random WL case. In the realistic
WL case, this gure increases up to 118 minutes. Since our measurements are based on
a 24/7 experiment, this represents a major reliability issue in all those scenarios in which
piconets are permanently deployed and used continuosly, such as, wireless remote control
systems for robots, and aircraft maintenance system. In these critical scenarios, SIRAs and
masking are not enough, and extensive fault tolerance techniques shoud be adopted, such
as, using redundant, overlapped piconets. From an everyday dependability perspective [93],
SIRAs and masking strategies allow instead a signicant improvement. If we look at the
realistic WL, a failure happens about every 54 minutes (scenario 2). This number improves
to a failure every 118 minutes when SIRAs and masking are adopted. This means that a
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user surng the web or uploading a le via P2P over Bluetooth will experience the failure
of a node in the piconet about every two hours. Finally, as for the maintainability, with
reference to the random WL the MTTR decreases from 331.51 s to 75.34, thanks to SIRAs.
It results instead slightly longer (141.31 s) in the case with both SIRAs and masking, since
the remaining, unmasked failures (the 40.02% of the failures) are more severe, and require
costly recovery actions. Same considerations apply for the realistic WL.
If you try the best you can, the best
you can is good enough.
Radiohead - Optimistic
Chapter 4
FFDA of Mobile Phones
Modern mobile phones, or smart phones, are becoming more and more complex in order to meet
costumer demands. The complexity directly aects the reliability of mobile phones, while the user
tolerance for failures becomes to decrease, especially when the phone is used for business- or safety-
critical applications. Despite these concerns, there is still little understanding on how and why
these devices fail and no techniques have been dened to gather useful information about failures
manifestation from the phone.
This chapter addresses these problems by proposing a FFDA campaign on Mobile Phones, trying
to answer the key research questions which arise when targeting this type of devices.
4.1 Rationale and Characterization of the FFDA campaign
The measurement-based dependability characterization of smart phones is a complex task,
which is exacerbated by the lack of previous studies. At the end of chapter 2, two key
research questions have been posed in this respect:
 Where do we have to start from? And,
 How to collect the failure data?
In order to answer the rst question, we believe that it is needed to gain a rst under-
standing of the possible failures aecting mobile phones, in order to clearly identify what
has to be collected and how, thus leading to the answer of the second question. Following
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this rationale, this chapter presents a study of mobile phones failure data gathered from
the only publicly available source: the users. Thus, we found several web forums where
mobile phone users post information on their experiences using dierent devices. This ac-
tivity allows to answer the rst question by gaining useful insight into the nature of the
observed failure behavior, and to improve the understanding of the dynamics of typical
problems reported by cell phones customers. In particular, freezes and self-shutdown events
are reported as two of the more severe failure manifestations.
Building on this experience, a logger application is then conceived, in order to collect
failure-related information from mobile phones, thus answering the second question. The
logger has been installed on several Symbian OS smart phones, and has gathered failure data
on freezes and self-shutdowns for more than one year. We chosen the Symbian OS because
of i) its open programmability features with C++ and Java programming languages, and
ii) its wide spread use at the time of writing.
This rest of chapter gives the needed background on Smart phones and the Symbian OS,
then it presents the results from both the experimental campaigns: the preliminary study on
web forums, and the results of the data collected by means of the logger. The characteristics
of these two campaigns are summarized in table 4.1, according to the framework dened
in section 2.3. As one could expect, the rst study achieves a lower density than the
second one, and it mostly produces qualitative results. On the other hand, the second
study benets from the presence of a bigger number of data items, each one more detailed
than web forums' reports, thus allowing for a better quantitative characterization of mobile
phones dependability. It also permits to uncover the major failure causes.
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Table 4.1: Characterization of conducted studies on mobile phones
Analysis of failure reports from web forums
ValueDimension
FilteringManipulation
IdleWorkload
Human operatorLevels
Failure reportsData Source
ClassificationAnalysis
Not givenConficence
18 items/monthDensity
533Data Items
30 monthsLength
Definition of an high-level failure model, 
understanding of potential causes
Achieved 
Results
Mobile PhonesTarget System
Third PartySource
AcademyActor
Dependability StudyPurpose
2006Date
Analysis of failure data gathered via the logger
ValueDimension
Filtering, temporal coalescenceManipulation
IdleWorkload
OS, ApplicationLevels
Event logs (Panics and high level events)Data Source
Classification, Dependability 
Measurement, Other (root cause analysis)
Analysis
Not givenConficence
89 items/monthDensity
1246Data Items
14 monthsLength
Quantitative measures, uncovering of 
actual underlying causes 
Achieved 
Results
Symbian OS Smart PhonesTarget System
InternalSource
AcademyActor
Dependability StudyPurpose
2006Date
It is interesting to notice how the framework dened in section 2.3 allows for a quick
comparison of FFDA studies. For example, from table 4.1, we can quickly conclude that
the logger study is of higher quality if compared to the web forums study. Similarly, both
works are not deep as the one performed for Bluetooth (see table 3.1)
4.2 Background on Smart Phones and the Symbian OS
4.2.1 The Evolution of Mobile Phones
Mobile/cellular phone evolution can be described according to three waves, each one char-
acterized by a specic class of mobile terminal [47]:
 Voice-centric mobile phone (rst wave): a hand-held mobile radiotelephone for use
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Figure 4.1: Mobile phones' market growth
in an area divided into small sections (cells), each with its own short-range trans-
mitter/receiver. These devices support a special text notication service called SMS
(Short Message Service).
 Rich-experience mobile phone (second wave): a mobile phone with numerous advanced
features, typically including the ability to handle data (web-browsing, e-mail, personal
information management, images handling, music playing) through high-resolution
color screens.
 Smart phone (third wave): a general-purpose, programmable mobile phone with en-
hanced processing and storing capabilities. It can be viewed as a combination of a
mobile phone and a Personal Digital Assistant (PDA), and it may have a PDA-like
screen and input devices.
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Newer mobile phone models on the market feature more computing and storing capabil-
ities, new operating systems, new embedded devices (e.g., cameras, radio) and communica-
tion technologies/protocols (Bluetooth, IrDA, WAP, GPRS, UMTS), as well as new shapes
and designs. As shown in Figure 4.11, the number of units sold during the third quarter of
2005 (205 millions) doubled with respect to the third quarter of 2001 (97 millions units).
In the same period, the percentage of smart phones sold has sextupled. While innovative
features are attractive and meet customer demands, the race toward innovation increases
the risk of delivering less reliable devices, since new mobile phones are often put on the
market without comprehensive testing.
According to industry sources the time from conception to the market deployment of
a new phone model is between 4 to 6 months. Clearly the pressure to deliver a product
on-time frequently results in compromising its reliability. The hope is that any potential re-
liability problems can be xed quickly by developing new releases of phone rmware, which
can be installed on the phone by service phone centers.
4.2.2 Mobile Phone Architectural Model
This section introduces a software layered architecture model for mobile phones. The model,
which is depicted in Figure 4.2, is based on the architecture of the current generation of
smart phones.
In the case of simpler devices, e.g., voice-centric or rich-experience mobile phones, some
layers may not be present or may be integrated in another layer. As Figure 4.2 shows, the
1sources: http://www.itfacts.biz, http://www.theregister.co.uk
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Figure 4.2: Mobile phones' architectural model
term rmware encompasses everything between Hardware and Applications. The software
layers are written onto read-only memory (ROM) and can be updated by \ashing" the
ROM. The rmware encompasses: i) device drivers supporting storage or communication
hardware, ii) the operating system kernel (OS), iii) application engines or middleware (MW)
providing a set of Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) for mobile phone program-
ming (e.g., SMS or phonebook management), and iv) the Graphical User Interface (GUI)
API. It should be noted that, on some mobile phones, the GUI layer is not implemented as
rmware, and can be upgraded without ashing the ROM.
4.2.3 Symbian OS fundamentals
Symbian [47] is a light-weight operating system specically tailored for smart phones and
carried out by several leader mobile phone's manufacturer companies. It is based on a hard
real-time, multithreaded kernel that is designed according to the micro-kernel approach.
Specically, the kernel only oers basic abstractions, i.e., address spaces, thread scheduling
and message passing interprocess communication; all other system services are provided
by server applications. Clients access servers using message passing kernel's mechanisms.
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Examples of servers are the File Server, for les' management, the Window Server, for user
interface drawing, and the Message Server for the Short Message Service (SMS) manage-
ment.
Since mobile phones resources are highly constrained, special care has been taken for
memory management issues, throughout the design of the Symbian OS. Specic program-
ming rules are dened so as to free unused memory and to avoid memory leaks, even in
the case of failures. In particular, the following mechanisms have been designed: the clean-
up stack, the trap-leave technique, and the two-phase construction paradigm. All these
mechanisms are tightly linked together. The clean-up stack is an OS resource storing the
references of all the objects allocated on the heap memory. As for the trap-leave technique,
it is similar to the try-catch paradigm dened for C++ and Java languages: if problems
arise during the execution of a trap block, the current method \leaves", and the control
steps back to the caller which handles the problem. In the meanwhile, the OS is responsible
to free all the objects which have been stored in the clean-up stack during the execution of
the trap block, thus avoiding potential leaks. Finally, the two-phase construction paradigm
is dened to properly construct objects with dynamic extensions. The mechanism assures
that, when errors occur during the construction of an object, the dynamic extension is
properly freed by means of the clean-up stack.
As far as multitasking issues are concerned, the Symbian OS denes two levels of mul-
titasking: threads and Active Objects (AOs). Threads are scheduled by the OS thread
scheduler, which is a time-sharing, preemptive, priority based scheduler. At the upper
Chapter 4. FFDA of Mobile Phones 128
Kernel
space
Active ObjectThread
Non-preemtive scheduling, 
Event driven synchronization mechanisms
Thread Scheduler
Time-sharing
Preemptive
Priority based scheduler
Symbian Application (or server)
Active
Scheduler
Figure 4.3: Symbian OS multitasking model
level, multiple AOs run within a thread (see gure 4.3). They are scheduled by a non-
preemptive, event-driven scheduler, called active scheduler. In other terms, AOs multitask
cooperatively using an event-driven model: when an AO requests a service, it leaves the
execution to another AO. When the requested service completes, it generates an event that
is detected by the active scheduler, which in turn inserts the requesting AO in the queue
of the AOs to be activated. Non-preemption was chosen to meet light-weight constraints,
avoiding synchronization primitives such as mutexes or semaphores. Moreover, AOs be-
longing to the same thread all runs in the same address space, so that a switch between
AOs incurs a lower overhead than a thread context switch.
As shown in gure 4.3, a typical Symbian OS application (or server) consists of a thread
running an active scheduler which coordinates one or more AOs. Each application is in
turn scheduled by the OS thread scheduler. However, AOs non-preemption characteristics
make them not suitable for real-time tasks. On Symbian OS, real-time tasks should be
rather implemented using threads directly. The whole design constitute a good compromise
between real-time and light-weight design requirements.
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A crucial aspect of interest for our activity is represented by panics. In the Symbian
OS world, a panic represents a non-recoverable error condition launched by either user or
system applications. Applications which are not able to treat an occurred error have to
notify a PANIC EVENT to the Kernel. The panic information associated with the event is
a record composed of its category and type. Once this event has been notied, the applica-
tion is killed by the kernel. As for panics notied by system servers, the kernel can decide
to reboot the phone to recover them, based on the severity of the panic.
Finally, as for failure logging, the Symbian OS oers a particular server (the ogger) al-
lowing an application to log its information. Yet, to access the logged data of a generic
X system/application module it is necessary to create a particular directory, with a well
dened name (e.g. Xdir) under a particular path. The problem is that the names of such
directories are not made publicly available to developers, and are used by manufacturers
during the development. Recently, a tool called D EXC2 has been proposed to register all
panic events generated on a phone. However, the tool does not relate panic events with
failure manifestations, and running applications and phone's activity at the time of the
failure. This solicited us to build an ad-hoc failure logger for Symbian Smart Phones.
2D EXC is a Symbian project, available at http://www.symbian.com/developer/downloads/tools.html
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The phone freezes whenever I 
try to write a text message, 
and stays frozen until I take 
the battery out.
random wallpaper disappearing 
and power cycling, due to UI 
memory leaks.
a) b)
Figure 4.4: Mobile phones' failure reports examples: a) a user reported problem; b) a known
issue
4.3 Starting Point: Web Forums-based analysis
In this section a high level characterization of mobile phones' failures is proposed as the
starting point of the subsequent FFDA campaign conducted via the logger. Such a char-
acterization is based on data gathered from several web forums3 where mobile phone users
post information on their experiences using dierent devices.
The identied failure reports have been divided in two groups:
 User-reported problems: These reports contain qualitative information and allow iden-
tifying a failure type, user activity when the failure occurred, and actions taken by
the user to recover. Figure 4.4a shows an example of a user-reported problem.
 Known issues: These reports are more accurate, since they correspond to known
design or implementation aws conrmed by manufacturers. From these reports,
it is possible to understand an underlying failure cause and pinpoint the software
component(s) responsible for the problem. Figure 4.4b shows an example of a known
issue.
The posted information has been carefully ltered in order to consider only those posts
3We considered www.howardforums.com cellphoneforums.net, www.phonescoop.com, and
www.mobiledia.com.
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that signal a failure of the device. The reports have then been classied along several di-
mension and then analyzed.
4.3.1 Classifying Dimensions
Failure Types
A failure is dened as an event that occurs when the behavior exhibited by the phone
deviates from the specied one. These failure categories we selected so that they represent
the bulk of the reported data. (Clearly it is possible that other categories not present in
the analyzed logs exist.) Based on the available data, ve failure categories were dened:
 Freeze (lock-up or a halting failure [1]): The device's output becomes constant, and
the device does not respond to the user's input.
 Self-shutdown (silent failure [1]): The device shuts down itself, and no service is
delivered at the user interface.
 Unstable behavior (erratic failure [1]): The device exhibits erratic behavior without
any input inserted by the user, e.g. backlight ashing, continuous self-shutdowns, and
self-activation of applications or modes of operation.
 Output failure (value failure [13]): The device, in response to an input sequence,
delivers an output sequence that deviates from the expected one. Examples include
inaccuracy in charge indicator, ring or music volume dierent from the set one, event
reminders going o at wrong times, and unexpected text displayed when browsing the
Internet.
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 Input failure (omission value failure [13]): User inputs have no eect on device behav-
ior, e.g. soft keys and/or key combinations do not work.
The failure classes dened above indicate that mobile phones exhibit the kinds of failures
observed in traditional computer systems, e.g., timing failures (freeze and self-shutdown),
value failures (output and input failures) and erratic failures (unstable behavior).
User-Initiated Recovery
User-initiated actions to recover from a device failure can be classied according to the
following categories:
 Repeat the action: Repeating the action is sometime sucient to get the phone work-
ing properly, i.e., the problem was transient.
 Wait an amount of time: Often it is enough to wait for a certain amount of time
(the exact amount is not reported by users) to let the device stabilize and deliver the
expected service (i.e., the device simply xed itself).
 Reboot (power cycle or reset): The user turns o the device and then turns it on to
restore the correct operation (a temporary bad state is cleaned up by the reboot).
 Remove battery : Battery removal is mainly performed when the phone freezes. In this
case, the phone often does not respond to the power on/o button. Battery removal
can clean up a permanent bad state (e.g., due to a user's customized settings) and
enables the correct operation.
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 Service the phone: The user has to bring the phone to a service center for assistance in
xing the problem. Often, when the failure is rmware-related, the recovery consists
of either a master reset (all the settings are reset to the factory settings and the user's
content is removed from the memory) or a rmware update, i.e., uploading a new
version of the rmware. Hardware problems are xed by substituting malfunctioning
components (e.g., the screen or the keypad) or replacing the entire device with a new
one. Reports indicate that experienced users can apply master reset or update the
rmware by themselves.
It is reasonable to assume that, in the case of a failure, a user would rst repeat the action
(which initially caused the failure) wait for an amount of time, and if the device still does
not work, try to reboot it. If the reboot cannot be performed, the user would remove the
battery, and as a last resort, he/she would bring the phone in for service. Note that if a
failure report does not contain any information about the recovery action taken by the user,
we classify the recovery action as unreported.
Failure Severity
In introducing failure severity, this study takes the user perspective and denes severity
levels corresponding to the diculty of the recovery action(s) required to restore the correct
operation of the device.
 High: A failure is considered to be highly severe when recovery requires the assistance
of service personnel.
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 Medium: A failure is considered to be of medium severity when the recovery requires
reboot or battery removal. A reboot may abruptly interrupt the action performed by
the user (call, message composing/reading, or browsing), whereas a battery removal
often causes a loss of customized phone settings, which have to be manually re-set by
the user.
 Low : A failure is considered to be of low severity if the device operation can be
reestablished by repeating the action or waiting for an amount of time.
Failure Causes
Ideally, using the insights provided by the failure data, one could attempt to determine
root causes (in terms of software and/or hardware components) of failure. Unfortunately,
user-reported problems do not usually contain enough detail to trace back to a failure cause
or to pinpoint the component that creates problems. Therefore, in many cases, we simply
indicate rmware as a cause of failure, meaning one of the layers between the hardware and
the applications. On the other hand, reports of known issues allow more accurate identi-
cation of the component(s) responsible for the failure.
Device activity at the time of a failure
This information allows us to understand what application the device was running at the
time the failure. This way, critical applications can be pinpointed.
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Figure 4.5: Mobile phones Failure types and severity
4.3.2 Results from the Reports' analysis
The results discussed in this section are obtained from the analysis of failure reports posted
between January 2003 and June 2005. A total of 533 problems (466 user-reported and
67 known issues) were used in this study. Phone models from all the major vendors are
present: Motorola, Nokia, Samsung, Sony-Ericcson, LG, besides Kyocera, Audiovox, HP,
Blackbarry, Handspring, and Danger. It is worth noting that 22.3% of failure reports are
from smart phones, although smart phones represent only 6.3% of the market share in 2005
(see Figure 4.1). We attribute this to the fact that smart phones (i) have more complex
architecture than voice-centric or rich-experience mobile phones and (ii) are open for users
to download and install third party applications and/or develop their own applications.
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a) b)
Figure 4.6: User initiated recovery: a) break-up including unreported recovery actions and
b) break-up without unreported recovery actions; the numbers are percentages of the total
number of failures
Analysis of Data on User-Reported Problems
The results discussed in this section are based on user-reported problems. Figure 4.5 depicts
a bar chart of failure types and failure severity. The most frequent failure type is output fail-
ure (36.3%), followed by freeze (25.3%), self-shutdown (16.9%), unstable behavior (18.5%),
and input failure (3.0%). Despite their high occurrence, output failures are usually of low-
severity since repeating the action is often sucient to restore a correct device operation.
On the other hand, self-shutdown and unstable behavior can be considered as high-severity
failures. The two categories contribute to 52.2% of the high-severity failures, although they
represent only 35.4% of the total number of failures. Phone freezes are usually of medium
severity, since reboot (2.4% of the total number of failures; see Table 4.2) or the battery
removal (9.0%; see Table 4.2) usually do the job and reestablish the proper operation. Only
in about 3.7% (see Table 4.2) of cases must the user seek assistance.
Figure 4.6 gives the break-up of user-initiated recovery actions. While the advance
smart phones have a watch-dog, which can perform an auto-reboot of the phone, it does
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Table 4.2: Failure frequency distribution with respect to failure types and recovery actions; the
numbers are percentages of the total number of failures
6.87
6.65
6.87
0.64
3.65
service 
phone 
8.800.640.210.211.72unstable behavior
7.7300.432.150self-shutdown 
13.735.790.640.438.80output failure 
0.860.6400.210.64input failure 
freeze 6.0104.299.012.36
unreported 
repeat the 
action 
wait an 
amount of time
battery 
removal 
reboot 
Recovery action
Failure Type
not seem to be eective. About 37% (see Figure 4.6a) of user reports do not indicate a
recovery action. In order to better understand the distribution of recovery actions, Figure
4.6b depicts the break-up considering only entries with a reported recovery actions. This,
given a recovery is attempted, shows that in 38.23% of the cases users bring the phone to be
xed by the service personnel. This could imply that often users are not able to reestablish
correct operation of the device. The most common recovery action is a reboot of the device
(22.53%), followed by battery removal (19.11%).
To gain an understanding of the relationship between failure types and recovery actions,
Table 4.2 reports failure distribution with respect to failure types and corresponding recov-
ery actions. From the recovery action perspective, one can see that reboots are an eective
way to recover from output failures (8.8% of the total number of failures). This indicates
that output failures are often due to a temporary bad state in the software, which is cleaned
up by the reboot. Battery removal is required to x phone freezes. From this one can infer
that freezes are mainly due to a permanent bad state (e.g., invalid user settings) that can be
cleaned up by removing the battery. Data in Table 4.2 show also that a signicant number
of freezes (4.29% of the total number of failures) are recovered by simply waiting an amount
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Figure 4.7: Break-up of failures per component; the numbers are percentages of the total
number of failures
of time for the phone to respond. This may indicate that a certain fraction of battery re-
movals and reboots in response to freezes are due to impatient users. Furthermore, it can
be observed that self-shutdown and unstable-behavior failures usually require the phone to
be serviced by a specialist. This once again conrms the high severity of this type of failure.
Analysis of Data on Known Issues
In contrast to the user-reported problems, data on known issues provides better explanations
for failure causes and enable identifying components responsible for the failure. The break-
up of failures per component is depicted in Figure 4.7. One can see that GUI and application
engines (middleware) are serious dependability bottlenecks, together accounting for 62.5%
of failures. Failures originating in applications themselves are responsible for about 15.63%
of failures. Thus it can be desirable to provide application developers with programming
tools/frameworks for fault/error management.
The data also provide insight into failure causes, which we divided into three categories:
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 Software errors/bugs: The most common software bugs found in the reports include
memory leaks, use of incorrect resources (such as wrongly written strings, or images
converted with an erroneous bit depth), wrong data type casting operations, bad han-
dling of indexes/pointers to objects such as phonebook entries, incorrect management
of buer sizes, and writing incomplete data to memory. These bugs are usually discov-
ered by manufacturers (by keeping track of user complaints) and xed by providing
new rmware to be uploaded on devices. Insucient testing is one of the primary
reasons that these problems escape.
 Resource exhaustion or interferences: Two runtime conditions are often indicated
as leading to failures: i) full internal secondary memory - the erasable programmable
ROM used to store program binaries and ii) process interferences, e.g., race conditions
when accessing shared resources such as operating system. Figure 4.7 indicates that
OS-related problems account for 9.38% of failures. Consequently it might be benecial
to harden OS tasks responsible for memory and resource management.
 Hardware and drivers of communication protocols: A signicant percentage of failures
are caused by: (i) hardware glitches/faults (3.13%), often due to a physical damage,
such as accidental drops or knocks. [70] indicates, for example, that a mechanical
stress can cause failures of the interconnections within the phone; (ii) communica-
tion protocol errors (4.7%) due to aws in communication drivers, e.g., Bluetooth or
CDMA/GSM protocols. Often, as discussed in the next section, these failures man-
ifest during Bluetooth utilization or during a CDMA/GSM search for the tower signal.
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Table 4.3: Failure frequency distribution with respect to: a) running application, b) failure type
and number of running applications; the numbers in the table are percentage of total number of
failures
2.36Playing with images
1.29Wallpaper set + camera
1.29Using the phonebook
1.72mp3 listening + call 
1.50Gaming 
20.47Other
1.93Browsing
2.58SMS Receiving/reading
2.79SMS Composition
2.79Searching for signal
3.65Using Bluetooth
12.65Call
46.14No active applications
Percentage 
of Failures
Running application(s) 
during the failure
a) b)6.0147.8546.14all
0.864.7212.88unstable behavior
1.506.229.23self-shutdown 
1.7218.0316.52output failure 
01.721.29input failure 
freeze 1.9317.176.22
210
Number of running apps
Failure Type
Failure Frequency versus Mobile Device Activity
Table 4.3a reports the percentage of failures with respect to the mobile device activity
at the time of a failure. A signicant fraction of failures (46.14%) manifests without any
application running on the phone aside from OS tasks. Since most phones are based on
well tested commodity hardware, we speculate that the problem is an OS and/or rmware
(most likely the drivers).
Most of failures, while running applications, occur during a call (12.65%). This should
be expected, since voice connection still remains a primary function of mobile phones. Rel-
atively few failures manifest during Bluetooth utilization (3.65%). While this percentage is
small (Bluetooth is not deployed on all phones), it may indicate a problem of potentially
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greater signicance in future phones, if we consider the results of the previous chapter.
However, we do not have data on application usage, which would enable relating applica-
tion failure rates with the application's usage.
Table 4.3b shows that the majority of failures occur while no applications or a single appli-
cation executes on the device. As for failures that manifest while two (or more) applications
are running on the device (the third column in table 4.3b), most often one of the running
applications is either a search for the tower signal or a call (which account, respectively, for
33% and 52% of cases in which multiple applications are running during the failure). The
second application is usually a data-driven application, e.g., mp3 player, Internet browser,
or the ring tone setting. This indicates that interactions/interferences between the commu-
nication rmware and the runtime environment (for data driven applications) is one of the
most common failure causes.
4.4 Data Collection Methodology
The results presented in previous section guided the denition of a data collection method-
ology for smart phones, based on the development of an ad-hoc logger application, to be
deployed on actual phones. We concentrate on freeze and self-shutdown failures, since they
are easy to detect, yet severe failure manifestations. Some unstable behavior failures, such
as repeated self-reboots, can be captured as well. As for input and output failures, we do
not pay attention to them for their less important severity and for the fact that the au-
tomatic detection of value failures would require the implementation of a perfect observer
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which has a complete knowledge of the system specication [13].
The main objective of the logger is to detect and record the occurrences of freezes and
self-shutdowns. Other than this, it is important to catch the status of the phone during the
failure.
In the following subsection, the methodology is described according to the FFDA steps
dened in section 2.2.
4.4.1 Smart phones Under Test
The system under test is composed of a set of 25 smart phones with dierent versions of the
Symbian OS, from the 6.1 to the 8.0 and 9.0. The majority of them carries out the version
8.0, which was the most released one at the time the analysis started. The targeted phones
belong to students, researchers and professors from both Italy and the USA. The phones
had the logger installed on them and were normally used from users during the collection
period (hence, an idle workload is supposed to be adopted).
4.4.2 Failure Data Logging and Collection
In this section, the architecture of the logger, and the related collection infrastructure, is
presented. The content is extracted from a previously published work, devoted to the design
of the logger [3].
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Figure 4.8: Overall architecture of the Logger for Symbian OS smart phones
Logger High Level Architecture
We designed a logger application as a set of AOs, each one responsible of a particular task.
The logger architecture is shown in gure 4.8. Each AO interacts with a particular OS
server to perform its task, and all AOs use File Server facilities to store their data. The
logger is conceived as a daemon application that starts at the phone start-up and that
executes in background. The AOs building the logger are detailed in the following.
 Heartbeat : it is in charge of detecting both freezes and self-shutdowns. More details
about the heartbeat technique can be found in the next subsection.
 Running Applications Detector : In order to be conscious of the phone status during
the failure, this AO periodically stores on the runapps le the list of IDs of all the
applications running on the phone. The list is obtained by requesting it to the Ap-
plication Architecture Server. This way, the applications running during a failure can
be pinpointed.
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 Log Engine: it is responsible to collect the smart phone activity (e.g. calls, messages,
and browsing). The information is gathered from the Database Log Server, which
logs phone's activity, and it is stored into the activity le. This allows to gather more
information on the phone status.
 Power Manager : it provides information about the battery status, in order to distin-
guish self-shutdowns due to failures from those due to low battery. The battery status
is gathered from the System Agent Server, and it is stored into the power le.
 Panic Detector : collecting panics as soon as they are launched is one of the main
objectives of the logger. It allows to identify the underlying causes of a self-shutdown
or freeze. In order to gather panics and the related information (e.g. panic category
and type), the Panic Detector exploits the services oered by the RDebug object
oered by the Symbian OS Kernel Server. In particular, the Panic Detector registers
to the RDebug's getException API so as to be notied whit the panic information
whenever a panic occurs on the phone.
Other than collecting panics, the Panic Detector is also responsible of putting all the in-
formation produced by the other components together into one Log File. This operation is
performed either when a panic is detected or when the logger application starts (i.e., when
the phone starts). A drawback of the logger is that it cannot store data about File Server's
failures. Nevertheless, this cannot be avoided in that there is no way to permanently store
any information when the File Server fails.
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Detecting Freezes and self-shutdowns
The Heartbeat AO periodically writes a heartbeat item on the beats le. The item is
composed of a time-stamp and a status info, i.e. ALIVE, REBOOT, MAOFF, and LOWBT.
During normal execution, the Heartbeat writes an ALIVE item. When a shutdown is
performed either by the user or automatically undertaken by the kernel, the Heartbeat
writes a REBOOT item, since it is capable to capture the phone shutdown event. It is worth
to mention that when the phone is rebooted the OS leaves a certain time to applications to
complete their tasks. This time is sucient for the Heartbeat to write the REBOOT item.
A user initiated turn o of the whole logger application causes instead a MAOFF (Manual
OFF) item to be written. Finally, if a shutdown is due to low battery (the information
about the battery status is requested to the Power Manager), a LOWBT (LOW BaTtery)
item is written.
When the phone is turned on and the logger starts, the Panic Detector checks the
last written item by the Heartbeat. When an ALIVE is found, the phone has been shut
down by pulling out the battery. In all other cases (i.e., a shutdown due to low battery,
user, or kernel) the Heartbeat would have written REBOOT or LOWBT. This means that
the phone was frozen, coherently with the fact that pulling out the battery is the only
reasonable user-initiated recovery action for a freeze. Therefore, a freeze is registered by
the Panic Detector, along with the information gathered by the Log Engine and the Running
Applications Detector.
On the other hand, a REBOOT can be found for three reasons. First, the phone rebooted
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itself. Second, it was rebooted by the user to recover a failure (e.g., output failure). Third,
it was regularly shut down. Hence, the problem of distinguishing this three cases arises.
Unfortunately, we are not able to systematically distinguish phone induced reboots from
manual ones, because the generated event i.e., the one captured by the heartbeat, is the
same in both the cases. However, they can be distinguished by looking at the o time of
the phone, or reboot duration. It is reasonable to state that:
TSS < TMS (4.1)
where TSS is the duration of a self reboot and TMS is the duration of a manual shutdown.
In other terms, the duration of a shutdown (e.g., when the phone is shut down over the
night) is greater than the duration of a self-shutdown. A manual reboot requires at least
the user to press the on button, which generally requires more time than a self-shutdown.
The Panic Detector registers a self-shutdown event and its duration. This way, the reboot
duration can be analyzed a posteriori.
Choice of the Heartbeat Frequency
The hertbeat frequency fh is a logger's crucial parameter since it determines the time gran-
ularity at which the above mentioned durations, i.e., TSS , and TMS , can be measured.
It would thus be desirable to choose an arbitrary big fh to increase the precision of the
measurements. However, this is not possible for two practical reasons: i) the battery con-
sumption induced by the logger increases as fh increases, and ii) the heartbeat precision
decreases as fh increases, as will be shown later by our experiment. The heartbeat precision
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can be dened as:
precision =
Th
Th + w
; Th =
1
fh
(4.2)
where w is the write delay induced by the File Server. In other terms, once xed a
heartbeat frequency fh, and thus a heartbeat period Th, the heartbeat items will not be
written exactly each Th, but they will be written each Th plus the time w needed to
invoke the File Server, transfer to it the information to write, access the le, and actually
write it. The bigger is fh, the smaller is the precision, because as Th decreases, it becomes
comparable with w. Moreover, as Th decreases, w increases because the File Server
starts to be overloaded with requests. This is conrmed by our experiment.
We evaluated the average w achieved as a function of fh, with dierent workloads
running on the phone: SMS, phone call, video call, listening of an audio clip, and Bluetooth
le transfer. We also performed measurements with a \stand-by workload", i.e., when the
phone is in stand-by mode. The measurements were performed on two dierent Symbian
smart phones: Nokia 6680 and Motorola A1000. For each xed fh, we run the heartbeat
AOs concurrently with one of the mentioned workloads. As an eect of the writing delay,
the timestamps on the beats le are written with a period Th + w. Hence, from the
timestamps we can evaluate the average w.
Figures 4.9 and 4.10 shows the results of the experiment. As we expect, the average w
is an increasing function of fh, independently from the workload. The case of idle workload
(gure 4.9) shows that a fh = 2Hz (Th = 0:5s:) is a physical upper bound after which w
starts to increase almost exponentially. For this reason, the experiments with the other
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Figure 4.9: Write delay w as a function of fh, stand-by workload
workloads have been run with fh ranging from 0.1 Hz to 2 Hz. Figure 4.10 shows that the
most critical application is the video call. This could be expected as the video call use a wide
range of phone's resources. From gure 4.10 one could conclude that the best choice to meet
precision requirements would be fh = 0:1Hz or even lower. On the other hand, very low
frequencies aect the time granularity. As a compromise we chose fh = 0:33Hz (Th = 3s:),
that is, the point after which the precision becomes unacceptable if a video call is performed.
Distributed Data Collection Architecture
In order to collect the Log Files of all the monitored phones, we developed a data collection
architecture for Log Files gathering. The architecture is 3-tier and it is depicted in gure
4.11.
The rst tier is the phone. In particular, we developed a Java midlet for the phone using the
Java 2 Micro Edition technology. The logger requests the user to send the Log File when it
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Figure 4.10: Write delay w as a function of fh, other workloads
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Figure 4.11: Distributed Data Collection Architecture
reaches a certain size. When the user is ready, the midlet can be used to send the Log File
to the tier 2, the Gateway Workstation (GW), via a Bluetooth connection. However, if the
user's phone or GW does not provide Bluetooth connection facilities, he or she can avoid
to use the midlet and can transfer the le via the serial cable usually used to synchronize
the phone with a computer.
The GW (tier 2) is a user's computer connected to the Internet. It runs our software to
receive the Log File via Bluetooth, and to send it to our Database node (tier 3) using the
Internet. To do so, the user must authenticate himself/herself to the Database node. Again,
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Figure 4.12: Distribution of reboot durations. The right-side histogram zooms the left-side
one for durations less than 500 seconds.
if Bluetooth connections are not available, the GW allows the user to select the Log File to
send from his/her computer's le system.
Finally, the tier 3 stores the received les on a centralized database, after checking the Log
File format. The data collected on the database can then be used to perform the analysis.
4.4.3 Data Filtering and Manipulation
As a rst step to be performed, it is necessary to lter out regular shutdown events that
are normally triggered by users, thus isolating self-shutdown events, according to equation
4.1. Unfortunately, it is not possible to automatically distinguish between the two, since
the generated event i.e., the one captured by the Heartbeat AO, is the same in both cases.
However, they can be discriminated by looking at the o time of the phone, or reboot
duration, which is registered by the Panic Detector.
Figure 4.12 shows the distribution of reboot durations. The histogram on the left-side
considers all the registered shutdown events (1778 events). From the histogram, two peak
bars can be noticed: a rst one close to the origin, which should contain all self-shutdown
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Figure 4.13: Panics and HL events coalescence scheme
durations, and a second one around 30000 seconds (about eight hours and 20 minutes),
corresponding to the o time over the nights (users usually turn o their phones at night
time). The histogram on the right-side is a zoom on the rst peak, for durations less than
500 seconds. It clearly evidences a peak around 80 seconds, which corresponds to the median
self-shutdown duration. Also, the number of events slowly approaches to 0 for durations
bigger than 360 seconds. Based on these data, we ltered-out all shutdown events with a
duration bigger than 360 seconds. The remaining events are assumed to be self-shutdown
events. In particular, 471 such events (the 24.2% of the overall sample) are identied.
From the collected data, it is possible to infer the relationship between panics and high
level (HL) events (i.e., freeze and self-shutdown). To do so, it is necessary to coalesce panic
events with freeze and self-shutdown events, similarly to the merge and coalesce scheme al-
ready dened for Bluetooth. The adopted scheme is depicted in gure 4.13. When a panic is
found in the Log File, freeze and self-shutdown events registered on the same phone after
the panic are searched, within a temporal window. The gure evidences that there can be
panics which do not relate to HL events, as well as isolated HL events. Careful attention
must be payed to the tuning of the temporal window. An analysis of the data in our possess
evidences that the number of coalesced events increase signicantly for window's sizes up
to ve minutes. After this size, we must wait for relative big sizes (around one hour) to
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appreciate a further, slight increase of this number of coalesced events, meaning that the
window starts to collapse events which are most probably uncorrelated. Hence, we choose
a window size equals to ve minutes.
4.5 Key Findings
This section reports the results of a 14 months collection campaign conducted on the previ-
ously mentioned 25 Symbian smart phones. A total number of 360 freezes and 471 (ltered)
self-shutdown HL events have been collected. As for panics, the logger captured 415 panic
events, belonging to several dierent categories and types.
4.5.1 Freeze and Self-shutdown Measurements
The Mean Time Between Freezes (MTBFr) and the Mean Time Between Self-shutdowns
(MTBS) have been evaluated, averaged for each phone. It results: MTBFr = 313 hours,
and MTBS = 250 hours. Hence, a user experiences a Freeze about every 13 days, and a
self-shutdown about every 10 days, on average. These gures give an overall idea of today's
mobile phones user-perceived dependability. While these values are acceptable for everyday
dependability requirements [93], they evidence the limits for the application of smart phones
in critical applications.
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Table 4.4: Collected panics typologies, descriptions, and frequencies
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%
it appears when the TInt value passed to SetVolume(TInt) gets 10 or moreMMFAudioClient
Failed to write data into asynchronous call descriptor to be passed back to clientMSGS Client
Corrupt edwin state for inlining editingEIKCOCTL
Not documentedPhone.app
occurs when using a listbox object from the eikon framework and an invalid Current Item Index is specified.
occurs when using a listbox object from the eikon framework and no view is defined to display the object.EIKON-
LISTBOX
occurs when one active object's event handler monopolizes the thread's active scheduler loop and the application's ViewSrv
active object cannot respond in time (the View Server monitors applications for activity/inactivity, if it thinks the application is in 
some kind of infinite loop state it will close it. Clever use of Active Objects should help overcome this).
ViewSrv
This panic is raised by the Kernel Server when it attempts to close a Kernel object in response to an RHandleBase::Close() 
request. The panic occurs when the object represented by the handle cannot be found. The panic is also raised by the Kernel 
Server when it cannot find an object in the object index for the current process or current thread using the specified object 
index number (the raw handle number). The most likely cause is a corrupt handle.
KERN-SVR
This panic is raised when attempting to complete a client/server request and the RMessagePtr is null.
This panic is raised when any operation that moves or copies data to a 16-bit variant descriptor, causes the length of that 
descriptor to exceed its maximum length. It may be caused by any of the copying, appending or formatting member functions 
and, specifically, by the Insert(), Replace(), Fill(), Fillz() and ZeroTerminate() descriptor member functions. It can also be 
caused by the SetLength() function.
This panic is raised when the position value passed to a 16-bit variant descriptor member function is out of bounds. It may be 
raised by the Left(), Right(), Mid(), Insert(), Delete() and Replace() member functions of TDes16.
USER
Not documented
Not documented
This panic is raised if no trap handler has been installed. In practice, this occurs if CTrapCleanup::New() has not been called 
before using the cleanup stack.
This panic is raised by the Error() virtual member function of an active scheduler, a CActiveScheduler. This function is called 
when an active object's RunL() function leaves. Applications always replace the Error() function in a class derived from 
CActiveScheduler; the default behaviour provided by CActiveScheduler raises this panic.
This panic is raised by an active scheduler, a CActiveScheduler. It is caused by a stray signal.
Raised by the destructor of a CObject. It is caused, if an attempt is made to delete the CObject when the reference count is 
not zero.
E32USER-
CBase
This panic is raised when a timer event is requested from an asynchronous timer service, an RTimer, and a timer event is 
already outstanding. It is caused by calling either the At(), After() or Lock() member functions after a previous call to any of
these functions but before the timer event requested by those functions has completed.
This panic is raised when an unhandled exception occurs. Exceptions have many causes, but the most common are access 
violations caused, for example, by dreferencing NULL. Among other possible causes are: general protection faults, executing 
an invalid instruction, alignment checks, etc.
This panic is raised when the Kernel Executive cannot find an object in the object index for the current process or current 
thread using the specified object index number (the raw handle number).
KERN-EXEC
MeaningPanic
4.5.2 Captured Panics
Table 4.4 reports the list of all the encountered panics during the observation period. The
table contains panic categories, panic types, the percentage of their occurrence with respect
to the total number of panics, and the description of the panic, mostly extracted by the
Symbian OS documentation. The meaning of all encountered panics gives an overall picture
of the software defects conducting to failures. Among them, the most frequent ones are
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Figure 4.14: Distribution of panics registered as a cascade
access violations caused by deferencing null, which cause the Symbian kernel executive to kill
the responsible application and to signal a KERN-EXEC type 3 panic. However this panic
type includes other causes such as general protection faults, executing an invalid instruction,
and alignment checks. Other frequent causes are invalid object indexes (KERN-EXEC type
0 panic), runtime errors related to the heap management (causing E32User-CBase panics),
and copy operations causing a descriptor to exceed its maximum length (USER type 11
panic). It is interesting to notice that these results are coherent with what was found on
web forums.
In some cases, more than one panic can be registered as a cascade, as evidenced in gure
4.14. Since panicking is the last operation an application or system module performs (just
after, the application is killed by the kernel), this proofs the existence of error propagation
phenomena in the OS, despite its micro-kernel architecture.
Chapter 4. FFDA of Mobile Phones 155
(a) (b)
Figure 4.15: Panics and HL events: a) overall summary, b) details with respect to freeze
and self-shutdown events
4.5.3 Panics and High Level Events
Figure 4.15 shows the results of the previously dened coalescence activity. In particular,
gure 4.15a gives an overall summary, reporting also the distribution of isolated panics, i.e.,
those panics which are not related to any HL event. Perhaps these panics cause output
failures. However, our logger is not able to intercept this kind of failures.
A rst important evidence is that more than a half of the registered panics (51%) relate
to HL events. If we consider the fewness of HL events (about one every 11 days), these
relationships cannot be just a coincidence. As a further conrmation, if we include all the
shutdown events in the analysis (hence a 300% increase of the number of events, from 471
to 1778 shutdown events), the percentage of panics that relate to HL events gets only a 4%
increase, to 55%. This also reinforce the results given in section 4.4.3: the shutdown events
which are ltered out are regular user-triggered shutdowns.
From gure 4.15a, we can observe that there is a set of panic categories which is never related
to HL events, such as EIKON-LISTBOX, EIKCOCTL, MMFAudioClient, and KERN-SVR.
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The rst three panics are typical application panics, related to the view or the audio stream-
ing. This indicates a good resilience of the OS with respect to application panics. More
frequent system panics, such as KERN-EXEC, E32USER-Cbase, USER and ViewSrv, can
either cause an HL event or not. In our opinion, this depends on the component that caused
the panic: if it is an indispensable system server, its death will then cause a whole phone
crash. Otherwise, if it is an application, once it is killed by the kernel, the phone keeps
working properly. As a further observation, there have been panics, such as the Phone.app
and MSGS Client, which always cause a self-shutdown. We recall that the kernel might
decide to reboot the phone in response to some panics and to the component that provoked
them. This means that these two panics were always caused by important system modules
or applications. For example, Phone.app is an always running system application, repre-
senting the phone itself.
Figure 4.15b details the relationship between panics, freezes and self-shutdowns, by re-
porting also the panic type. As already observed, there are panics which only relate to
self-shutdown events, such as Phone.app and MSGS Client. In the same way, we can isolate
panics that are the potential symptoms of freezes, such as heap management (E32USER-
Cbase), USER, and ViewSrv, and KERN-EXEC type 0 panics. On the other hand, access
violation-related panics (KERN-EXEC type 3) can cause both the anomalous HL behaviors.
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Table 4.5: Relationship between panics and the phone activity
act. type
Allcateg.  
54.8...9.1940.40.37.4.78unspecified
38.64.049.56..17.3.1.106.62Voice call
6.62..1.10.4.41..1.10message
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4.5.4 Phone Activity at Panic Time
As a further result, we investigate on the phone's activity, in terms of user activity and
running applications, at the time a panic is registered. Using the same coalescence method-
ology already mentioned in previous section, table 4.5 reports the activity that resulted to
be performed by the user at the time of the panic, in terms of voice calls and text messages
(the only ones registered on the Database Log Server). Only the panics which are related
to an HL event are considered in this analysis. Interestingly, about the 45% of panics
are registered while the user were performing real-time activities, such as a voice call, or
sending/receiving a short message. This conrms what we observed on web forums, and
evidences the presence of interferences between normal applications/system modules, and
real-time threads concurrently running on the phone. In other terms, this is a symptom
of the lack of isolation between real-time modules and time-sharing, interactive modules.
Thus, more eort should be directed to the enforcement of the isolation between the two
system modules. Also, there are panics, such as USER and ViewSrv, that show-up only
while a voice call is performed. Equally, there are panics, such as Phone.app, appearing
only while a short message is sent/received. Hence, these particular panics are more likely
than the other ones to be due to the presence of real-time operations.
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As far as applications are concerned, the Running Application Detector allowed as to
collect the set of running application at the time of the panic. It is interesting to notice that
often only one application is found to be running at panic time, other than always running
system applications, as can be observed by gure 4.16. Hence, as opposite from intuition,
running more applications at the same time does not cause more panics.
Table 4.6 gives a summary of the more frequent sets of applications that were found
in correspondence to panics. Only the sets with signicant percentage were taken into
account, covering 53% of the total number of panics. The rows reports panic categories
organized with respect to the HL event they cause, in order to have an overall picture of
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what manifestation we can expect from a certain set of applications. On the column, the
sets of applications that were coalesced with the panic events are reported. The numbers
reported into every cell of the table are percentages of the total number of panics, e.g., the
Clock application has been found in correspondence of the 3.2% of panics, and, in particular,
of KERN-EXEC panics which cause the phone to freeze.
Coherently with what was found on web forums, the Message application is one of the
main responsible of panics. Also, the Bluetoth browsing tool is present, as pointed out by
users on the forums. Other potential dependability bottlenecks are the camera, and the log
of incoming/outcoming calls. The table also give some insights on the running applications
which, even panicking, do not cause HL events. Perhaps, in these cases, only output failures
are manifested to the user.
Conclusions
This dissertation addressed dependability issues of mobile distributed systems. Due to the
spread use of these systems into our everyday life, the eld failure data analysis approach has
been adopted. This approach represents indeed a viable methodology to evaluate qualitative
and quantitative dependability aspects of operational systems.
Two particular technologies had been chosen as representative of a wider class of systems.
The Bluetooth wireless technology and smart phone devices equipped with the Symbian OS.
The research activity dealt with fundamental issues which arise when conducting FFDA
studies on these kinds of systems, by proposing novel solutions or by enriching existing tech-
niques. In particular, a multi-source approach has been used for the Bluetooth campaign to
monitor the thorough behavior of the protocol stack. Such an approach enables to vertically
investigate failure causes, to the extent of providing masking strategies, thus improving the
overall dependability level. Moreover, automated workloads have been developed and de-
ployed on real systems to address the inability of studying this kind of systems under idle
workloads, i.e., the normal load at which they operate. As for the mobile phones campaign,
we started from the failure information which is available on the web. Although unstruc-
tured, this information allowed to have a rst understanding on the failures phenomenology,
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which in turn lead to the denition of a specic failure logger application. The logger has
been demonstrated to be an ecient mean to capture more structured failure data, which
permitted the measurement of failure times along with the investigation of related causes.
In both cases, it is clear how FFDA can be successfully applied to mobile distributed
systems, and how it keeps representing an eective way to gather a substantial understand-
ing on existing systems' dependability characteristics. This understanding can thus be used
to improve future instances of mobile distributed systems, towards the goal of dependable
ubiquitous computing.
Other than providing specic considerations on both the presented case studies, this
chapter summarizes the general lessons which have been learned from this three years expe-
rience and that can be reasonably taken into account when performing future FFDA studies.
Lessons Learned
On the Use of a Multi-source Approach
Existing literature on the FFDA eld mainly considered eld data originated from one
source, i.e., system event logs or maintenance sta failure reports. Conversely, both the
conducted studies adopted a multi-source approach for the data collection. Such a multi-
source approach provides deep insights into the failure phenomenology. In addition, it
allows for a vertical investigation of the failure occurrences, thus enabling the identication
of the \chain of threats" from faults to errors and failures. For instance, the \bind failed"
failure on Bluetooth PANs was discovered to be an heisenbug with particular underlying
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activation conditions. We then completely masked the failure by preventing such conditions
from occurring.
As a nal remark, using more data sources enables for an higher number of failure data
items to be collected in the time unit, thus improving the density of the campaign.
On the Use of Multiple Automated Workloads
As observed in section 2.5, the majority of FFDA works adopt idle workload, since the aim
of FFDA itself is to characterize the dependability of a system under its normal conditions.
The only works adopting automated workloads are concerned with the Internet, since its
spot usage does not permit to evaluate continuous time dependability measures. The same
consideration applies to the Bluetooth campaign presented in chapter 3. However, a a
major issue to be addressed by \eld data researchers" is the choose of what can be the
appropriate workload to deploy. Indeed, as observed in section 2.4.1, there is a strong
correlation between the system's load and the failing behavior of a system.
With respect to the Bluetooth campaign, we have seen how the use of two dierent
workloads can provide a more thorough view of dependability aspects, thus fostering more
considerations and avoiding the risk of obtaining results which are biased from the par-
ticular adopted workload. The use of a more stressful workload, such as the random one,
permits to activate failure modes more quickly, giving statistical signicance to collected
data in a shorter period. It also permits to identify usage patterns which have to be avoided
to develop more robust applications. On the other hand, the use of a realistic workload
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cannot be neglected, since it allows to characterize the dependability behavior of the system
under study when used for everyday applications.
Bluetooth Campaign Specic Considerations
Presented results have shown how failure data provide helpful insights to design fault tol-
erance means for operational systems. Respectively, up to 168% and 569% availability and
reliabilty improvements have been demonstrated with respect to the random workload, and
up to 9% and 128% improvements in the case of the realistic workload. Several lessons
have also been learned about preferable usage patterns, from a dependability perspective.
Examples are to avoid caching by performing the SDP search before the PAN connection,
and to increase the timeout in the switch role API.
L2CAP and BNEP protocols do not perform error checks and ow controls since the
Baseband channel is assumed, by Bluetooth designers, to be reliable. However, the analysis
evidenced that often hard payload corruptions propagate to L2CAP and BNEP errors, due
to corruptions of the L2CAP or BNEP headers. A valid improvement would derive from
the use of even the simplest error check strategy, such as parity bits or low-overhaed CRC
schemes.
Based on this experience, an enhanced version of the Linux BlueZ BT protocol stack has
been successfully submitted, which includes all the ndings we gathered from the analysis,
and that developers can use for building more robust BT applications.
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Mobile Phones Campaign Specic Considerations
The conducted campaign produced several interesting results. For instance, the results show
that the majority of Kernel exceptions are due to memory access violation errors (56%), and
heap management problems (18%), despite the Symbian OS design goals, i.e., the adoption
of a micro-kernel model and the provision of advanced memory management facilities.
There is also an evidence of failure propagation between multiple applications, due to
the uncovering of cascaded panic events. It is interesting to notice how the results are often
coherent with the information gathered from publicly available web forums. The forums
indeed pinpointed memory leaks as one of the main causes of failures. In the same way,
both the forums and the logger-based analysis evidence that the majority of failures manifest
while the user is performing real-time tasks, such as a voice call or the sending/receiving of
a text message. This suggests to strength the isolation between interactive and real-time
tasks.
From the user-perceived dependability point of view, the analysis shows that users
experience a failure every 11 days, on average, which manifest in the form of freeze or self
shutdown.
Although the eort made to enforce proper heap management via trap-leave and clean-
up stack facilities, there is a non negligible amount of panics (E32User-Cbase panics, 18%)
related to the misuse of heap management mechanisms, such as the absence of a trap handler
(type 69) and the attempt to delete an object with a non-zero reference counter (type 33).
The severity of such panics cannot be understimated, since often they lead to the freeze
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of the phone. Since this especially applies to E32User-Cbase type 33 panics, more eort
should be dedicated to strength the runtime support so as to mask the error and avoid the
panic.
KERN-EXEC type 3 panic are the more frequent ones, and are the unique panics which
may lead to both freeze and self-shutdown. This is probably due to the fact that such
a panic is pretty generic and embrace a wide set of problems, such as access violations,
general protection failures, executing an invalid instruction, alignment checks, etc. A deeper
comprehension could be derived if this panic was split into multiple types by designers.
Finally, it is worth observing that there are freezes and self-shutdowns which remain
isolated. This means that not all the anomalous phone activity is properly managed by
panicking, hence applications and system modules may be wrongly programmed in a way
that conduct them to crash without signaling any panic.
FFDA: Towards a Unied View
During this three years experience matured on FFDA issues and practice it has been recog-
nized the need for the assessment of a more comprehensive methodology for FFDA. As it
has been observed in section 2.5, the wider scope of the FFDA research, dealing with more
and more dierent types of systems, is not accompanied by novel methodological achieve-
ments. In fact, all the related works recently published are based on results and approaches
which have been proposed between 80s and 90s. In addition, while there are several dierent
studies targeting the same system, the results are dicult to generalize because both the
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environmental conditions and the data collection methodology may dier.
The denition of a unied FFDA methodology would instead enable a consistent compar-
ison of results and conclusions from studies conducted from dierent actors (both academic
or industrial) or performed on dierent instances of the same target system. This would
in turn facilitate the communication within the FFDA research community, thus achieving
more credible results.
A valid starting point for the denition of such methodology is represented by the
framework dened in section 2.3. It provides a mean for comparing dierent studies and it
suggests to researches which is the relevant methodology-related and quantitative informa-
tion that they should evidence into their work. In addition, such a methodology should be
capable of drawing guidelines and best practices about i) which kind of sources of failure
data should be adopted for a given class of systems; ii) which kind of workloads should be
deployed; and iii) which type of collection infrastructure should be implemented. Finally,
a particular eort should be devoted towards the recognition of a common structure of the
collected eld failure data, i.e., one of the formats adopted by already proposed tools for
FFDA (see section 2.2). This would let data be always stored in the same format, thus
letting more research teams to conduct dierent analysis on the same data set, and then
compare the results.
The denition of data sets conforming to a common format, along with the creation of
publicly available failure data repositories would also enable more exchange between the
academy and the industry.
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This need is being more and more recognized within the dependability research commu-
nity. The work in [90], published in the current year, is a rst example of a study conducted
on a large and publicly available failure data source. Authors conclude with the hope that
this data might serve as a rst step towards a public data repository, thus encouraging ef-
forts at other sites to collect and clear data for public release. Even in this dissertation, we
recognized the importance of analyzing public failure data, i.e., the data from web forums,
although unstructured. The same approach has also been followed by other studies [32].
All this ferment has been recently discussed in the context of an interesting panel, named
\In Search of Real Data on Faults, Errors and Failures", and held at the sixth European
Dependable Computing Conference (EDCC-6, Coimbra - Portugal, October 2006). Pan-
elists evidenced that, even if industries demonstrate great interest in the FFDA research
eld, they often hide collected failure data due to strategic reasons that can compromise the
market view [31]. The new approach would instead encourage industries to publish their
data into the novel, anonymous format. Then, the adherence to the common format and
the existence of public repositories, would assure the data to be analyzed by third party
actors.
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